STATE OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, PETITIONER,
v.
MICHAEL KENDRICK, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Parole Commission sought certiorari review of a trial court order terminating Michael Kendrick's supervised release without resentencing him or allowing him to withdraw his plea. The court held that the trial court violated separation of powers and procedural due process by divesting the Commission of its supervisory authority without notice and without properly addressing Kendrick's motion for sentence correction.
A trial court may not terminate supervised release as a substitute for proper resentencing. The trial court must either resentence the defendant in accordance with his plea agreement or allow him to withdraw his plea. Terminating supervised release without notice to the Parole Commission, which has supervisory authority, violates separation of powers and due process.
[1] A trial court may not terminate a defendant's supervised release without notice to the supervising authority when the defendant moves for sentence correction.
[2] A trial court's order divesting a state parole commission of its supervisory authority over a defendant's conditional release without notice violates the separation of po…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it was error for the trial court merely to terminate his supervised release rather than resentencing him in such a way as to accomplish that result”
Establishes that terminating supervised release without resentencing is improper; Kendrick himself conceded this error
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter Kendrick violated probation on count II, he was credited with time served on count I against a new term of imprisonment, resulting in a requirem…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Conditional Release Supervision cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
After violating probation on count II, Michael Kendrick was credited with time served in prison on count I against his new term of imprisonment. While on conditional release supervision, he moved the court for correction of his sentence due to an unintended result — in that he was being required to serve more time than anticipated — asking for a downward modification of his sentence to effectuate the intention of all parties to his plea agreement. Instead of modifying his sentence, the trial court issued an order terminating his supervised release. The order was entered without notice to the State of Florida Parole Commission, which was charged with supervising Kendrick’s conditional release. The Commission filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari challenging the order. The Commission argues that, while the trial court could have resentenced Kendrick in accordance with his plea or allowed him to withdraw his plea, it did neither, but instead divested the Commission, a part of the executive branch, from its supervisory authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, see generally Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla.1953), and without notice, though its authority was affected, see generally Singletary v. Duggins, 724 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Kendrick concedes that it was error for the trial court merely .to terminate his supervised release rather than resentencing him in such a way as to accomplish that result.
Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the order on review, and remand for the trial court once again to address Kendrick’s motion, so that it may resentence him if it determines resentencing is warranted.
STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1953)
- Singletary v. Lancy Duggins, 724 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)