IN THE INTEREST OF C.D., MINOR CHILD. T.E.D., FATHER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reversed a termination of parental rights order entered by default against an unrepresented father who was three minutes late to his initial advisory hearing. The court held that the trial court erred by failing to treat the father's timely written explanation as a motion for rehearing under the juvenile procedure rules.
The trial court erred in entering a default termination of parental rights. The trial court should have treated the father's timely written letter explaining his tardiness as a motion for rehearing under the applicable juvenile procedure rules, and should not have entered final judgment without addressing this submission and ensuring the father's right to counsel.
[1] A trial court should treat a timely mailed letter explaining circumstances for tardiness to a hearing as a motion for rehearing.
[2] A father unrepresented in a termination proceeding, who was defaulted for being three minutes late to an advisory hearing, is entitled to have his circumstances reviewed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The father was three minutes late for the initial advisory hearing. He waited outside the courtroom in the waiting area for forty-five minutes until given information as to the proper courtroom. He was 'defaulted.'”
Establishes the father's excusable delay and the trial court's harsh response of entering default.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceT.E.D., the father, was three minutes late to his initial advisory hearing in a termination of parental rights case. He waited in the courtroom waitin…
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ALTENBERND, Chief Judge.
In this case, an order terminating parental rights was entered based upon a “default.” The father was three minutes late for the initial advisory hearing. He waited outside the courtroom in the waiting area for forty-five minutes until given 'informa tion as to the proper courtroom. He was “defaulted.” Although an attorney had been appointed to represent the father in an earlier shelter hearing1 and in the dependency proceeding,2 the father was unrepresented in the termination proceeding.3 Within ten days from the entry of the default, the father mailed a letter to the trial court explaining the circumstances that caused him to be late. The trial court should have treated this letter as a motion for rehearing. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.265. Instead, the trial court made no ruling on the letter and entered final judgment terminating the father’s parental rights on March 20, 2003. Counsel was not appointed to represent the father until April 16, 2003.
Although this case involves a termination proceeding and not a dependency proceeding, it is comparable to G.A. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and S.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 858 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). See generally § 39.801(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002) (explaining procedure for involuntary consent in termination of parental rights cases). Accordingly, we reverse the order terminating the father’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. This opinion does not require the trial court to alter custody or current visitation rights, but the trial court must review these issues and make a lawful decision as soon as possible following issuance of our mandate.
Reversed and remanded.
WHATLEY and CANADY, JJ., Concur. . See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.305(b)(6).
. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.320.
.See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.510(2).
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E.A. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 894 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…view of the public policy that frowns on termination of parental rights on a default basis, we conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in not setting aside or vacating the implied consent of E.A. to the termination. See B.H.; In Re C.D., 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); A.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 853 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); A.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 845 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Accordingly, we reverse the order terminating E.A.’s parental rights and remand…
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In the Interest of J.T. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 870 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ased upon a “default.” The Department of Children and Family Services concedes error. For the same reasons that we reversed in K.K. v. Department of Children & Families, 862 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), T.E.D. v. Department of Children & Families, 867 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), S.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 858 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and G.A. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), we reverse in this case. This opinion does not require…
Authorities Cited
- In the Interest of I.A. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 857 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- In the interest of B.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 858 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)