DAVID ALLEN FULLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
David Allen Fuller challenges his consecutive sentencing where a fifteen-year probationary sentence on count V was imposed consecutive to a thirty-year habitual offender sentence on count I, both arising from a single criminal episode. The court held that consecutive sentences are impermissible when one sentence involves a habitual offender enhancement and the other does not, if both crimes stem from the same criminal episode.
The court held that consecutive sentences are not permitted when a habitual offender enhancement is used on one count and a non-enhanced sentence is imposed consecutively on another count, if both crimes arose from the same criminal episode. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing.
[1] A fifteen-year probationary sentence on one count may not run consecutive to a thirty-year habitual offender sentence on another count when both counts arise from a singl…
[2] When a habitual offender sentencing scheme is utilized to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum on one or more counts arising from a single criminal episode, co…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When we offered the State an opportunity to address this case in light of Canavan, the rather vague response we received was less than helpful, but apparently acknowledged that our disposition of this case is governed by Canavan.”
Establishes that controlling precedent (Canavan) governed the outcome, despite the State's failure to properly cite it
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFuller was originally sentenced to a fifteen-year consecutive probationary sentence on count V while also being designated a habitual offender on that…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Probationary Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
TORPY, J.
Appellant challenges the lower court’s decision which denied his motion brought pursuant to Rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant raises several points on appeal, only one of which merits discussion, whether his fifteen-year probationary sentence on count V may run consecutive to his thirty-year habitual offender sentence on count I, even though both counts involve crimes that arose from a single criminal episode. We conclude that the consecutive sentences are not permitted and reverse for resentencing.
Originally, Appellant received a fifteen-year consecutive probationary sentence on count V, but he was also sentenced as an habitual offender on that count. On motion, the state conceded that the sentence was illegal under Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993). Upon resentencing, the court simply deleted the habitual offender designation on count V and reimposed the same sentence because fifteen years was within the statutory maximum, without enhancement, under the habitual offender statute. The issue in this appeal is whether the court properly imposed a non-habitual sentence consecutive to an habitual offender sentence where both crimes arose from the same criminal episode. Although not cited by either party in their briefs on appeal, we have previously answered this question in the negative in Canavan v. State, 842 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). When we offered the State an opportunity to address this case in light of Canavan, the rather vague response we received was less than helpful, but apparently acknowledged that our disposition of this case is governed by Canavan.
We think our holding in Canavan is mandated by Hale. The whole point in Hale is that once the habitual offender sentencing scheme is utilized to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum on one or more counts arising from a single criminal episode, consecutive sentencing may not be used to further lengthen the overall sentence. Although not cited by either party on appeal, we note and certify conflict with Davis v. State, 710 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
We assume that the State’s failure to cite two cases directly on point, one of which is a controlling decision of this court, was an oversight. We express our sincere hope that the State might be more helpful in focusing the court’s attention on control ling case law in the future, especially where, as here, the Appellant is pro se.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PLEÚS and PALMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Reeves v. State, 957 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2007)…la. 1st DCA 2004) [holding that the imposition of a non-HFO sentence following an HFO sentence which had been enhanced to the statutory maximum was improper where defendant’s two offenses arose out of a single criminal episode], and Fuller v. State, 867 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) [same], we conclude that these consecutive sentences, which arise from one criminal episode and together exceed the maximum incarceration permitted for any individual count under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, see…1 / 2
-
Kiedrowski v. State, 876 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), the Second District has held that imposition of a sentence of probation as a habitual offender, following a period of incarceration as a habitual offender, “was improper under the dictates of Hale v. State.” In Fuller v. State, 867 So. 2d 469, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D364 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb.6, 2004), the Fifth District was dealing with an issue which is similar to the one presented to us in this case. In that case a trial judge confronted with a motion to correct an illegal sentence simply remo…
-
Mills v. State, 23 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…sed for crimes committed during a single criminal episode are legal if the aggregate sentence is less than that which could have been imposed if all HFO eligible convictions had been enhanced and ordered to run concurrently. But see Fuller v. State, 867 So. 2d 469, 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that “[t]he whole point in Hale is that once the habitual offender sentencing scheme is utilized to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum on one or more counts arising from a single criminal episode, conse…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- Aultman v. Singletary, 710 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Canavan v. State, 842 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)