STATE, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS AND CLINTON CURTIS, APPELLEES
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The Florida Department of Transportation appealed a circuit court order temporarily reinstating an employee under the state's Whistle-blower's Act. The appellate court reversed, holding that the employee's complaint to the Florida Commission on Human Relations was untimely filed more than 100 days after the alleged retaliatory action, exceeding the statutory 60-day deadline, and that the FCHR lacked jurisdiction to proceed.
The court held that Curtis' complaint was untimely on its face, as it was filed more than 100 days after the alleged retaliatory action, exceeding the 60-day statutory deadline under section 112.31895(1)(a). The court further held that relation-back provisions under Florida Administrative Code rule 60Y-5.001(4) do not apply to Whistle-blower's Act proceedings because that rule is adopted pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act, and no provision of the Whistle-blower's Act grants the FCHR rule-making authority.
[1] A complaint alleging retaliatory action under the Florida Whistle-blower's Act must be filed within 60 days of the retaliatory act.
[2] The relation-back doctrine for administrative complaints, as provided by Rule 60Y-5.001(4), Florida Administrative Code, applies only to proceedings under the Florida Civ…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 112.31895(l)(a) provides that a complaint alleging retaliatory action by an employer must be filed no later than 60 days after the retaliatory act.”
Establishes the mandatory filing deadline for whistle-blower complaints under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClinton Curtis alleged he was separated from employment due to retaliatory action by DOT after reporting that DOT was overcharged by an independent co…
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The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) seeks reversal of a final order which temporarily reinstates Clinton Curtis “to his former contract provision with the Florida Department of Transportation,” on the authority of the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act, sections 112.3187-112.31895, Florida Statutes (2002).
This order was entered following a complaint by Curtis to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) in which he alleged that he had been separated from employment as a result of retaliatory action by DOT. Curtis alleged that DOT took such retaliatory action because he had reported that DOT was overcharged by an independent contractor for whom Curtis was formerly employed. Without reaching the question of whether Curtis’ employment status entitled him to the remedies available under the Whistle-blower’s Act, we hold the matter should not have proceeded to the circuit court because Curtis’ complaint to FCHR was untimely on its face.
Section 112.31895(l)(a) provides that a complaint alleging retaliatory action by an employer must be filed no later than 60 days after the retaliatory act. Here, on the face of Curtis’ complaint, the alleged retaliatory action occurred on April 1, 2002, and the complaint was filed on July 10, 2002, more than 100 days after the alleged act. Further, the date of Curtis’ complaint cannot be related-back to the date a similar complaint was filed by a DOT employee, Mavis Georgalis, because the administrative rule providing for this relation back doctrine, rule 60Y-5.001(4), Florida Administrative Code, is adopted pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act, section 760.06(12), Florida Statutes (2002), and is applicable to proceedings under that act.
We agree with the argument of the DOT that no provision of the Whistle-blower’s Act indicates that the legislature has given the FCHR rule-making authority under the Whistle-blower’s Act. See §§ 112.3187-112.31895, Fla. Stat.
Thus, because Curtis did not timely file his complaint, FCHR lacked jurisdiction over Curtis’ complaint and lacked the authority to file the petition seeking reinstatement of Curtis. See St. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court granting temporary reinstatement of Curtis is REVERSED.
KAHN AND BENTON, JJ., concur.
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- ST. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)