CHARLES G. STANICK, APPELLANT,
v.
T & B METAL WORKS INC., AND FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 2004-02-26
No. 1D03-380
ALLEN, KAHN and POLSTON, JJ., Concur.
867 So. 2d 523 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Charles Stanick appealed the denial of unemployment compensation benefits after voluntarily leaving his job due to work-related injuries. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the appeals referee and unemployment commission failed to properly apply the statutory definition of "good cause" for leaving employment, which includes illness or disability requiring separation from work.


Holding

An employee who voluntarily leaves work due to illness or disability requiring separation from employment has good cause under Florida Statutes § 443.101(l)(a)1. The proper inquiry is whether the employee, because of illness or disability, is physically unable to perform the job duties, not whether the employee attempted to secure another position with the same employer.


Headnotes

[1] An unemployed worker may qualify for unemployment compensation benefits unless they voluntarily left their work without good cause attributable to their employing unit.

[2] The statutory definition of "good cause" for leaving employment includes illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from work.

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Key Quotes

“the term "good cause" as used in this subsection includes only such cause as is attributable to the employing unit or which consists of illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from his or her work.”

States the statutory definition of good cause for leaving employment that the lower tribunal failed to properly apply

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Facts & Procedural History

Stanick quit his job as the result of work-related injuries that left him unable to perform his previous duties. The appeals referee acknowledged evid…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this unemployment compensation case, the appeals referee and the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission erred by failing to properly consider and apply section 443.101(l)(a)l., Florida Statutes (2002). The law provides that an unemployed worker may qualify for unemployment compensation benefits unless “he or she has voluntarily left his or her work without good cause attributable to his or her employing unit....” § 443.101(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). Although the referee purported to consider the question of good cause, the order fails to apply the relevant definition:

[T]he term “good cause” as used in this subsection includes only such cause as is attributable to the employing unit or which consists of illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from his or her work.

§ 443.101(l)(a)l., Fla. Stat. (2002).

Here, the referee acknowledged evidence establishing that appellant quit his job as the result of work-related injuries that left him unable to perform his previous duties. Unfortunately, the referee analyzed the good cause requirement without acknowledging that good cause statutorily includes illness or disability requiring separation from work. See Vajda v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 610 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (explaining that “[ujnder the Unemployment Compensation Law, ‘good cause’ for leaving a job includes ‘illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from his work’ ”). Under a proper application of the statute here, “[t]he inquiry is whether there is an illness or disability which makes the employee physically unable to perform the duties of the job.” Id.; see Krulla v. Barnett Bank, 629 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Here, the referee denied benefits based upon a finding that appellant “made no attempt to secure another position with the employing company.” Acknowledging this finding, we are nonetheless compelled to reverse because the proper inquiry is whether the employee, because of illness or disability, is no longer able to physically perform the job. Our reading of the order convinces us that the referee resolved this particular issue in favor of appellant.

REVERSED.

ALLEN, KAHN and POLSTON, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …dus. Relations Comm’n, 277 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). In such circumstances, the proper inquiry is whether an illness or disability renders the individual physically unable to perform the job duties. See Stanick v. T & B Metal Works, Inc., 867 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The appeals referee concluded as a matter of law that Appellant voluntarily had left work without good cause and, thus, was disqualified from receiving emergency unemployment compensation benefits. The appeals referee deemed “go…
  • …utory definition of good cause does not require that the cause be attributable to the employer when an employee voluntarily leaves because of illness or disability that renders them unable to perform the work. See Stanick v. T & B Metal Works, Inc., 867 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing where the referee analyzed the good cause requirement without acknowledging that good cause statutorily includes illness or disability requiring separation from work). In its order affirming the referee and in its argu…
  • …or she left employment without good cause attributable to the employing unit or which consists of illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from his or her work. § 443.101(l)(a)(l), Fla. Stat.; Stanick v. T & B Metal Works, Inc., 867 So. 2d 523, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). In determining this, the proper inquiry “should be whether the individual is physically unable to perform the job duties,” Krulla v. Barnett Bank, 629 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), not whether the individual first…

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