EDUARDO LUIS GALIANA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eduardo Galiana was convicted after jury trial of two counts of DUI manslaughter, two counts of vehicular homicide, leaving the scene of an accident, and unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender. The appellate court affirmed his convictions for DUI manslaughter, habitual traffic offender driving, and leaving the scene, but remanded to dismiss the vehicular homicide convictions because a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes.
The court affirmed the convictions for DUI manslaughter, habitual traffic offender driving, and leaving the scene of an accident. The court held that the prosecutor's closing statements, while bordering on inappropriate, were harmless and did not deprive Galiana of a fair trial, and thus the denial of the mistrial motion was not an abuse of discretion. The court reversed and remanded on the vehicular homicide counts, which must be dismissed because a single death cannot support convictions for both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide.
[1] A prosecutor's improper closing remarks do not warrant a mistrial if they are harmless, do not materially contribute to the conviction, and are not so fundamentally taint…
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial closing remarks that are deemed harmless in the context of the entire…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The prosecutor's comments, although bordering on inappropriate, were not of such a nature as to deprive Galiana of a fair trial, did not materially contribute to his conviction, and were not so fundamentally tainted or inflammatory that a new trial is warranted.”
Establishes the harmless error standard applied to evaluate allegedly improper prosecutorial statements in closing argument
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGaliana was convicted after jury trial of two counts of DUI manslaughter and two counts of vehicular homicide related to a fatal accident. He was also…
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PER CURIAM.
Eduardo Galiana was convicted after jury trial of two counts of DUI manslaughter and two counts of vehicular homicide, as well as leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage, and for unlawful driving as an habitual traffic offender. Galiana was sentenced to two consecutive fifteen year terms for the DUI manslaughter counts, five years concurrent on a guilty plea to the habitual traffic offender count, sixty days for leaving the scene, and sentence was suspended on the two counts of vehicular homicide. We affirm Galia-na’s convictions for DUI manslaughter, driving as an habitual traffic offender, and leaving the scene of an accident. We remand, however, for the trial court to dismiss the two counts of vehicular homicide.
Galiana asserts that his motion for mistrial should have been granted because of improper closing statements made by the prosecutor. The prosecutor’s comments, although bordering on inappropriate,1 were not of such a nature as to deprive Galiana of a fair trial, did not materially contribute to his conviction, and were not so fundamentally tainted or inflammatory that a new trial is warranted. See Lopez v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). In context of the entire trial and record on appeal, the comments, made in closing, were harmless and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galiana’s motion for mistrial. We have considered Galiana’s remaining points on appeal and find no error. However, the judgments of conviction for vehicular homicide, which sentences were suspended, must be dismissed. State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla.1993) (a single death cannot support convictions for both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide).
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
. During the State's initial closing, the prosecution stated that "these two children are no longer with us, and will never be in the Keys with their parents, and will never spend the weekend playing with puppies.” The trial prosecutor later stated, "I suppose a person that gets as drunk as the defendant did, and drives as fast as he did, maybe it was a Russian roulette game; if it wasn't [the child victims], maybe somebody else.”
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Citator
Cited By
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Ivey v. State, 47 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…ions. We agree with the defendant’s assertion. Prior to Valdes, it was well settled that dual homicide convictions arising from a single death violated double jeopardy. See Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1193; Rodriguez, 875 So. 2d at 642; Galiana v. State, 868 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Factually, Houser is identical to this case in that it involved convictions for both DUI (then DWI) manslaughter and vehicular homicide for a single death, and the Court ruled that the defendant could not be punished for both. Th…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993)
- Tucker v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)