ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA MORGAN, APPELLEE
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Allstate Insurance Company appealed a summary judgment awarding personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to Linda Morgan for injuries sustained while operating a rented vehicle. The court reversed, holding that the PIP section's definition of "insured motor vehicle" was unambiguous and clearly limited coverage to vehicles owned by the insured, and therefore the trial court erred in borrowing a definition from other policy sections to expand coverage.
Morgan was not entitled to PIP benefits because she was not riding in an "insured motor vehicle" as clearly and unambiguously defined in the PIP section of the policy. The definition of "insured motor vehicle" in the PIP section was not ambiguous and therefore could not be modified by definitions in other sections of the policy.
[1] An insurance policy is construed against the insurer only if its language is ambiguous.
[2] Definitions provided within a specific section of an insurance policy control over definitions in other sections unless the policy language creates an ambiguity.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An insurance policy is properly construed against the insurer only if the language of the policy is deemed to be ambiguous.”
Establishes the foundational rule that ambiguity is a prerequisite for construing a policy against the insurer.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMorgan was injured in a collision while operating a vehicle rented by her boyfriend, Maurice Sample, who had rented it while his own car was being rep…
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NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Allstate Insurance Company challenges a summary judgment granting Linda Morgan personal injury protection benefits under an automobile insurance policy it issued to Maurice Sample. The circuit court entered the summary judgment after borrowing a definition from the liability and uninsured motorist sections of the policy in order to resolve a perceived ambiguity in the PIP section. We conclude that there was no ambiguity in the relevant language of the PIP section and that the court erred in finding that Morgan was entitled to benefits under that coverage.
Morgan was injured in a collision when operating a vehicle rented by Sample, her boyfriend. Sample had rented the vehicle while his car was being repaired. Allstate denied Morgan’s claim for PIP benefits, whereupon she filed this lawsuit. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court noted that the PIP section of the policy did not define the term “insured auto,” but that the liability and uninsured motorist sections of the policy defined that term to mean “a substitute private passenger auto being temporarily used while an insured auto is being serviced or repaired.” Relying on Travelers Insurance Co. v. Smith, 328 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), the court borrowed that definition of “insured auto” and construed the PIP provision in favor of coverage for Morgan.
Smith was inapplicable to this case. In Smith, the policy provided PIP coverage for an “insured motor vehicle,” which meant a “motor vehicle of which the ... insured is the owner.” The court discerned an ambiguity because the liability section of the policy defined “owned automobile” to include a temporary substitute automobile not owned by the insured. The court resolved the ambiguity by construing the contract against the insurer, which drafted it, and in favor of the insured. Therefore, it found that the plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits. Smith, 328 So. 2d at 872-73.
Here, the PIP section of the policy contained the following relevant language:
Part III
Personal Injury Protection
Coverage VA
Allstate will pay to or on behalf of the injured person the following benefits. Payments will be made only when bodily injury is caused by an accident arising from the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Definitions
* * *
3. “Injured person” — means (a) Within the State of Florida (1) You or a resident relative while in, on, getting into or out of, or struck while a pedestrian by a motor vehicle.
(ii) Any other person while in, on, getting into or out of, and if a legal resident of Florida, any other person struck while a pedestrian by the insured motor vehicle.
* * *
4. “Insured Motor Vehicle” — means a motor vehicle:
(a) You own, and (b) for which the security is required to be maintained under the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault law, and (c) (i) for which a premium is charged, or (ii) a trailer designed for use with a private passenger automobile, or if not used for business purposes, a trailer designed for use with a pick up truck, panel truck or van.
Morgan was entitled to PIP benefits only if she was an “injured person” as defined in paragraph 3(a)(ii) of the PIP section definitions. She was not, because she was not riding in an “insured motor vehicle” as that phrase was specifically defined in paragraph 4 of the PIP section definitions.
In Smith, the definition of “owned automobile” elsewhere in the policy created confusion about the meaning of the phrase “motor vehicle of which the ... insured is the owner” as used but not defined in the PIP section. Here, the term “insured motor vehicle” was specifically defined, and that definition was clear and unambiguous. It simply could not be clouded by the definition of the phrase “insured auto” elsewhere in the policy.
“An insurance policy is properly construed against the insurer only if the language of the policy is deemed to be ambiguous.” USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 707 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citations omitted). Because the language at issue here was not ambiguous, and because Morgan was not entitled to PIP benefits under that unambiguous language, we reverse the summary judgment in her favor and remand with directions to enter judgment for Allstate.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
WHATLEY and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
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Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Devitis, 924 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…u have asked us to delete that vehicle from the policy; b. any additional vehicle on the date you become the owner ... c. any replacement vehicle on the date you become the owner. [*880] The same issue was presented in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 870 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), in which the claimant of PIP benefits was injured while she was driving a vehicle which had been rented by her boyfriend. The boyfriend had rented the vehicle while his own car was being repaired, and the issue was whether the Al…
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Direct Gen. Ins. Co. v. Aurea Vreeman, 943 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…. The coverage shifting language of the rental car agreement cannot serve to create coverage where none otherwise exists. See Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Devitis, 924 So. 2d 878, 879-880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 870 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (finding Morgan not entitled to PIP benefits because she was not in an “insured motor vehicle” as defined in the policy’s PIP definitions). Even if the rental car agreement language purported to create coverage where none otherwi…
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Shivers v. Enter. Leasing Co., 950 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…Enterprise, was obligated to pay for Shivers’ PIP benefits. We reverse, because the Aries policy does not provide PIP coverage to Shivers. See Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Devitis, 924 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 870 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The relevant provisions in the Aries policy are substantively indistinguishable from those at issue in Devitis and Morgan. Here, the Aries policy did not extend valid and collectible coverage to Shivers, nor was Aries required to…
Authorities Cited
- McCOMBS v. State, 328 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 328 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Bankers Ins. Co. v. Grenko, 707 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 707 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)