MARQUEL D. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's convictions for cocaine delivery and possession reversed because the State failed to introduce the cocaine into evidence at trial and provided no explanation for the omission.
When a defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance, that substance must be introduced into evidence if available, and the State's failure to do so without explanation requires reversal.
[1] When a defendant timely objects to the nonintroduction of a controlled substance at trial, the State must provide an explanation for the substance's absence or the convic…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance, that substance, if available, must be introduced into evidence but ... a defendant who fails to object to its nonintroduction may not be heard to complain of the error on appeal”
Florida Supreme Court standard establishing the requirement to introduce controlled substances and the consequence of failing to object
Marquel D. Williams was convicted of delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine. The State did not introduce the cocaine into evidence at trial.…
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DAVIS, Judge.
Marquel D. Williams challenges his convictions and sentences for delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine. Because the State failed to introduce the cocaine into evidence at trial and did not explain such failure, we reverse.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that “when a defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance, that substance, if available, must be introduced into evidence but ... a defendant who fails to object to its nonintroduction may not be heard to complain of the error on appeal.” G.E.G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla.1982). Here, Williams’ counsel raised the nonintroduction while moving for judgment of acquittal. When the trial court denied the motion, nothing more was said by the trial court or either party regarding the introduction of the cocaine. See Ortiz v. State, 843 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding evidence insufficient where “defense counsel raised the nonintroduction of the cocaine, and neither the FDLE lab chemist nor the officer who discovered the cocaine testified that [it] was not available”); Mack v. State, 711 So. 2d 1154, 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“After [defense] counsel made this argument, the State offered no excuse or explanation why it had not introduced the cocaine.”).
We accordingly reverse Williams’ convictions and remand with directions to discharge Williams.
Reversed and remanded.
NORTHCUTT and STRINGER, JJ., concur.
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Parker v. State, 20 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…trial court committed error when it permitted the introduction of the two prior transactions. We therefore reverse Parker’s final judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand this case for a new trial. SUAREZ, J., concurs. . Williams v. State, 870 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).…
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D.R.S. v. State, 912 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ase, it “would undoubtedly permit the [S]tate to reopen its case to offer the contraband as evidence.” 417 So. 2d at 978. This court has followed G.E.G. numerous times. See Ortiz v. State, 843 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Williams v. State, 870 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mack v. State, 711 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). But in the face of this longstanding case law, and D.R.S.’s argument, the State did not specifically ask to reopen its case in order to place the marijuana in evidence. We must r…
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Zetrouer v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)…7 (Fla. 1982) ("[W]hen a defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance, that substance, if available, must be introduced into evidence . . . ."); see also D.R.S. v. State, 912 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Williams v. State, 870 So. 2d 71, 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Accordingly, we reverse Zetrouer's conviction for possession of marijuana and remand for a new sentencing hearing using a corrected scoresheet. See Fernandez v. State, 199 So. 3d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("In general, whe…
Authorities Cited
- G. E. G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1982)
- Montrey Mack v. State, 711 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Blanchard, 843 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- Ortiz v. State, 843 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)