CLEO STINYARD, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2003-11-14
No. 2D03-1730
WHATLEY and KELLY, JJ., concur.
870 So. 2d 78 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in summarily denying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate an insanity defense.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant pleaded guilty to several charges and later sought postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating a…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

[*79] NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Cleo Stinyard Jr. appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm without discussion as to all of his claims, with one exception. On one claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Stinyard pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, battery on a law enforcement officer, depriving officer of means of protection, resisting officer with violence, and felony criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Stinyard to concurrent five-year prison terms on all counts.

Stinyard’s motion for postconviction relief alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of and investigate an insanity defense. Stinyard claimed that he is a paranoid schizophrenic and that he had not taken his medication at the time of the offenses. He alleged that his counsel was aware of Stinyard’s history of mental illness and the facts surrounding the offense, but counsel never investigated an insanity defense or informed him that such a defense was an option. This is a facially sufficient claim. See Forster v. State, 779 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Easley v. State, 742 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The circuit court did not specifically address this claim when denying Stinyard’s motion, nor did the court provide any record attachments to refute it. In fact, the transcript of Stin-yard’s plea colloquy contains admissions by his counsel that counsel did not fully investigate insanity as a possible defense. Therefore, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WHATLEY and KELLY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Spencer v. State, 889 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …a. 2d DCA 2001). Therefore, insanity was a defense available to Spencer. Ground one of Spencer’s motion presents a facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not refuted by the trial court’s order. See Stinyard v. State, 870 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (finding a postconviction claim asserting that trial counsel failed to inform defendant that insanity was an available defense is a facially sufficient claim). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider t…
  • Benny Watts v. State, 136 So. 3d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
    …hearing if there is nothing in the record to refute them. See, e.g., Childers v. State, 782 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); McAroy v. State, 597 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Spencer v. State, 889 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Stinyard v. State, 870 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Munoz v. State, 819 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Forster v. State, 779 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The lower court did not attach portions of the record showing that an insanity defense would not have been viable for appe…

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