DEAN TORRES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2004-01-16
No. 2D03-3311
ALTENBERND, C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur.
870 So. 2d 149 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Dean Torres was held in contempt for allegedly violating an injunction for protection against repeat violence based on a telephone call to the protected person. The court reversed because the trial court's finding of violation rested solely on inadmissible hearsay testimony from the complaining witness about what police reports said regarding the caller's identity.


Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to find a violation of the injunction because the trial court impermissibly relied on hearsay evidence. Without the inadmissible hearsay testimony, there was no admissible evidence that Torres made the phone call, and therefore the contempt conviction cannot stand.


Headnotes

[1] A finding of contempt based solely on inadmissible hearsay is legally insufficient.

[2] Testimony regarding information received from law enforcement, without independent knowledge, constitutes inadmissible hearsay.

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Key Quotes

“the court permitted the State to evade the proscription against hearsay when it allowed Mr. Cramer to testify that he 'had been hearing reports of a Poppy calling' and that he 'learned that Poppy was Dean Torres.'”

Establishes that the trial court improperly allowed hearsay testimony regarding police reports rather than the witness's independent knowledge.

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Facts & Procedural History

An injunction protected Donald Cramer's daughter from Dean Torres. Cramer received a phone call where the caller asked for his daughter by name; the c…

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Opinion of the Court
CASANUEVA, Judge.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

Held in contempt and sentenced to a suspended jail sentence and administrative probation for violation of an injunction for protection against repeat violence, Dean Torres contends that the trial court erred in basing its finding solely on inadmissible hearsay. We agree with Mr. Torres that the evidence was legally insufficient for the trial court to find that he violated the injunction and reverse.

The injunction in this case was in effect to protect the daughter of the complaining witness, Donald Cramer, who was the only person called to testify in the State’s case. Mr. Cramer testified that when he answered the telephone, a male voice asked for his daughter by name. Not recognizing the voice, Mr. Cramer gave the phone to his daughter, who then had a conversation with that person. Subsequently, Mr. Cramer became concerned; shortly after she received the call his daughter “became missing.” Mr. Cramer filed a report and gave the police the phone number of that call from his caller I.D.

At this point in the trial the assistant state attorney posed a series of questions to which objections were sustained, all of which dealt with how the Cape Coral Police Department handled the information Mr. Cramer gave them. For example, when the State asked whether Dean Torres was ever determined to be the person who made the call, a hearsay objection was sustained. Mr. Cramer then went on to testify that he did not know if the Cape Coral police had contacted the defendant; however, he filed an affidavit for violation of the injunction based on information he received from the Cape Coral Police Department. Although the trial court sustained a hearsay exception to a question asking why Mr. Cramer believed the person on the telephone was Dean Torres, Mr. Cramer was permitted to testify, over objection, as follows: “I had been hearing reports of a Poppy calling and being— calling her; and so when I heard the phone conversation, stated the name was Poppy, and I guess I put two and two together and.... ” A defense motion to strike was overruled, and the State went on to elicit from Mr. Cramer that the person who called identified himself as Poppy. Over objection, Mr. Cramer stated that he “learned that Poppy was Dean Torres.”

This recitation of the evidence demonstrates that the court permitted the State to evade the proscription against hearsay when it allowed Mr. Cramer to testify that he “had been hearing reports of a Poppy calling” and that he “learned that Poppy was Dean Torres.” Even though Mr. Cramer did not testify as to any specific out-of-court statements, this is a distinction without a difference: it is apparent that the State’s sole witness possessed no independent knowledge concerning the identity of the person who called the Cramer household on the date alleged.

Without the impermissible hearsay, the evidence was insufficient to find that Mr. Torres violated the injunction against repeat violence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to discharge the defendant.

Reversed and remanded.

ALTENBERND, C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Holborough v. State, 103 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
    …evidence of the defendant’s guilt.’ ” Florence v. State, 905 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Schaffer v. State, 769 So. 2d 496, 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)); accord Cedillo v. State, 949 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Torres v. State, 870 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Diaz v. State, 62 So. 3d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The statement of one person to another as to his identity is hearsay that does not fall under the section 90.801(2)(c) exclusion from hearsay for statements of “ident…
  • Robinson v. State, 989 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …ersonal knowledge of why she and the others were leaving or where they were going. She speculated about her “understanding” of events, based either on her assumptions or on hearsay statements that would not have been admissible. See Torres v. State, 870 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (concluding that evidence was insufficient to support contempt conviction when State’s sole witness testified to certain facts he gleaned by putting “two and two together”; even though witness did not repeat inadmissible hear…
  • A.A. v. State, 271 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)
    …le hearsay when she provided information about A.A's status as a runaway on specific dates without having personal knowledge of A.A.'s whereabouts on those dates. Impermissible hearsay may not support a finding of contempt of court. Torres v. State, 870 So. 2d 149, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). On remand, we remind the trial court of the requirement that, while a juvenile may be placed in a secure detention facility as a sanction for contempt of court, the trial court is required to consider alternate sanctions. §…

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