JOSHUA R. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2004-04-07
Nos. 1D02-4229, 1D02-5001
BOOTH, VAN NORTWICK and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
871 So. 2d 296 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

Smith appealed two consolidated cases challenging his sentencing and sex offender registration. The court affirmed one case, reversed and remanded the other due to the trial court's failure to enter a written judgment reflecting its corrected oral sentence, and rejected Smith's constitutional challenge to sex offender registration requirements.


Holding

The trial court erred by failing to enter a written judgment and sentence reflecting its oral pronouncement of correction, requiring reversal and remand for entry of a corrected written sentence. Smith's constitutional challenge to sex offender registration is without merit, as prior appellate decisions have rejected identical challenges to both section 943.0435 and Florida's sexual predator law.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's oral pronouncement of a corrected sentence must be reflected in a written judgment and sentence.

[2] A defendant's argument that Florida's sex offender registration statute is unconstitutional on due process grounds has been repeatedly rejected.

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Key Quotes

“The trial court, however, failed to enter a written judgment and sentence to reflect the corrected oral pronouncement of sentence.”

Establishes the basis for reversal and remand in Case No. 1D02-4229

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Facts & Procedural History

Smith was convicted of attempted lewd acts and grand theft. The trial court initially imposed split sentences for the attempted lewd acts and imposed …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this consolidated appeal, we affirm the appeal in Case No. 1D02-5001 without discussion. In Case No. 1D02-4229, appellate counsel filed a motion to correct sentencing errors pursuant to Florida rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) alleging that appellant’s new split sentences for attempted lewd acts were excessive and that sex offender probation could not be imposed for grand theft. The trial court agreed and orally pronounced a corrected sentence. The trial court, however, failed to enter a written judgment and sentence to reflect the corrected oral pronouncement of sentence. Accordingly, we reverse this sentence and remand for the entry of a corrected written sentence. See Montgomery v. State, 704 So. 2d 548, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in declaring appellant to be a sex offender and rejecting his argument that section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (1998), which requires the registration of “sex offenders,” is unconstitutional on the ground that it denies procedural due process. Appellant’s argument is without merit. We have recently rejected the same constitutional challenge both under section 943.0435, see Ames v. State, 870 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA March 11, 2004), and under section 775.21, Florida’s sexual predator law. See Frazier v. State, - — • So. 2d-, 2004 WL 221043, 29 Fla. Law Weekly D369 (Fla. 1st DCA, February 6, 2004), and cases cited therein. For purposes of appellant’s argument that a hearing is required before the stigma of sexual offender status is imposed, the two statutes are indistinguishable because they both require an automatic determination if one of the enumerated crimes has been committed, registration for life, and criminal prosecution in the event a defendant fails to register. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

BOOTH, VAN NORTWICK and LEWIS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Subido, 925 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …5th DCA 2004); Johnson v. State, 875 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Martin v. State, 864 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Miller v. State, 861 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Garcia v. State, 909 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Smith v. State, 871 So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Doe v. Moore, 410 F. 3d 1337 (11th Cir.2005). Subido’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), but review of the record reveals no issues of arguable meri…
  • Kensler v. State, 890 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    …nation can be raised in post-conviction motion, this court, in an appeal from the denial of a motion to correct sentencing error filed under rule 3.800(b), addressed the merits of the constitutional issue and affirmed the denial. See Smith v. State, 871 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).…
  • Theopholis Brinson v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)
    …t that by not providing a hearing before “sexual offender” status attaches, section 943.0435 violates a defendant’s right to procedural due process under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. See Ames, 870 So. 2d at 204; Smith v. State, 871 So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The only consideration for determining whether Brinson qualified as a “sexual offender” was whether he had been convicted of one of the offenses enumerated in section 943.0435(1)(a)1. Brinson’s satisfaction of this requirem…

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