MARVIN JENKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marvin Jenkins was convicted of two counts of sexual battery, but the appellate court reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance to allow two defense witnesses to testify that the victim had previously told them the sexual encounter was consensual.
Yes. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the continuance request. All four elements required for granting a continuance were satisfied: Jenkins exercised due diligence in subpoenaing the witnesses, the testimony would be substantially favorable to his defense, the witnesses were available and willing to testify, and denial of the continuance caused material prejudice to Jenkins.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a continuance when the defendant demonstrates prior due diligence, the likelihood of substantially favorable testimony, wit…
[2] The right of an accused to present witnesses in his or her own defense is a fundamental right.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There are few rights more fundamental than the right of an accused to present witnesses in his or her own defense.”
Establishes the constitutional foundation for the trial court's obligation to consider continuance requests when witnesses are unavailable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJenkins was charged with sexual battery. Jenkins's defense theory was that the victim consented to sex and only accused him of rape after he refused t…
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HAZOURI, J.
Marvin Jenkins appeals his conviction of two counts of sexual battery. We reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. The trial court erred by failing to grant Jenkins’s request for a continuance in order to present the testimony of two witnesses. ..These, witnesses would testify that the victim had told them that the sexual encounter with Jenkins had been voluntary and it was only after Jenkins refused to pay for the consensual sex that she decided to make a claim that she had been raped. During cross examination, the victim denied she had made such contradictory statements.
Jenkins’s theory of defense was that the victim had consented to have sex with him and that the only reason she claimed to have been raped was because he did not pay her. Carolyn and Keshara Griffin were deposed' by the state and were subpoenaed for trial by the defense; however, because their car broke down they were unable to get to,the courthouse as scheduled. The trial court refused to continue the proceedings to allow Jenkins’s counsel to secure their appearance. The trial court also refused to allow introduction of their depositions and rejected the defense counsel’s request to take their testimony by telephone. Jenkins argues that the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance constituted an abuse of discretion. We agree.
There are few rights more fundamental than the right of an accused to present witnesses in his or her own defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In order to prevail in a motion for continuance, the defendant must show: (1) prior due diligence to obtain the witnesses’ presence; (2) that substantially favorable testimony would be forthcoming; (3) that the witnesses were available and willing to testify; and (4) that the denial of the continuance caused material prejudice. See United States v. O’Neill, 767 F. 2d 780, 784 (11th Cir.1985); Smith v. State, 762 So. 2d 929, 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), review denied, 786 So. 2d 1188 (Fla.2001). In the instant case, each of the elements necessary for a continuance to be granted was present. Jenkins had placed the two witnesses under subpoena and the reason for the delay in appearing at trial was as a result of developing car trouble. The two witnesses would provide favorable testimony for Jenkins’s defense that the sexual encounter was consensual. In addition, the witnesses were available and willing to testify. Failure to grant the continuance to permit these witnesses to testify clearly caused material prejudice to Jenkins. We find that the trial court abused its discretion and therefore reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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McDUFFIE v. State, 970 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007)…n a defense witness is excluded. This is because “[t]here are few rights more fundamental than the right of an accused to present witnesses in his or her own defense.” Alexander v. State, 931 So. 2d 946, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 872 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)) (alteration in original), review denied, 944 So. 2d 988 (Fla.2006). In this case, defense counsel explained that Wiggins’ name had been inadvertently listed as only a penalty-phase witness and not as a guilt-phase witness.…
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Alexander v. State, 931 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…s Christian Migrant Ass’n, 884 So. 2d 1087, 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). This Court has previously determined that “[tjhere are few rights more fundamental than the right of an accused to present witnesses in his or her own defense.” Jenkins v. State, 872 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). A defendant’s fundamental right to defend himself or herself under the Sixth Amendment is denied when exculpatory evidence is excluded. Wessling v. State, 877 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Mattear v. State, 657 So. 2…
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Scott v. State, 17 So. 3d 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…ate, 915 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). As we have often declared, “ ‘there are few rights more fundamental than the right of an accused to present witnesses in his or her own defense.’ ” Alexander, 931 So. 2d at 950 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 872 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). Exclusion of exculpatory evidence violates a defendant’s fundamental right under the Sixth Amendment to present a defense. Wessling v. State, 877 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Mattear v. State, 657 So. 2d 46,…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973)
- United States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780 (11th Cir. 1985)
- Smith v. State, 762 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)