DIAMY CAMACHO, PETITIONER,
v.
KENDALL HEALTHCARE GROUP, LTD., D/B/A KENDALL MEDICAL CENTER, RESPONDENT

Fla. 3d DCA | 2003-11-26
No. 3D03-2930
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GREEN and WELLS, JJ.
872 So. 2d 922 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2003) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

This is a prohibition petition challenging a trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself after a mistrial was declared during jury trial. The court held that the judge's corrective actions against manifest improprieties do not constitute personal bias or prejudice requiring disqualification, and prohibition was therefore denied.


Holding

The trial judge should not be disqualified. The judge's actions represented appropriate exercises of judicial responsibility to take corrective action against manifest improprieties and did not stem from disqualifying personal bias or prejudice. A trial judge's expression of dissatisfaction with counsel or a client's behavior alone does not give rise to a reasonable belief of bias.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge's actions taken to correct manifest improprieties during a trial do not, in themselves, demonstrate personal bias or prejudice requiring disqualification.

[2] A lawyer cannot disagree with the court and deliberately provoke an incident rendering the court disqualified to proceed further.

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Key Quotes

“A lawyer cannot disagree with the court and deliberately provoke an incident rendering the court disqualified to proceed further.”

Establishes that parties cannot manufacture disqualification by provoking judicial corrective action

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Facts & Procedural History

During a jury trial, a mistrial was declared. The plaintiff thereafter moved for disqualification of the trial judge. The petitioner (plaintiff) conte…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

This is an application for prohibition claiming that the trial judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for disqualification filed after a mistrial was declared during a jury trial. The record shows1 that the now-challenged actions of the trial court did not stem, as the petitioner contends, from any disqualifying personal bias or prejudice towards her or her counsel. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon-3 E(l)(a). Rather, they involved well-considered and appropriate exercises of “judicial responsibility to take corrective action” against manifest improprieties. Birotte v. State, 795 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), review denied, 819 So. 2d 132 (Fla.2002). Prohibition is therefore denied. See State ex rel. Fuente v. Himes, 160 Fla. 757, 36 So. 2d 433, 438-39 (1948)(“A lawyer cannot disagree with the court and deliberately provoke an incident rendering the court disqualified to proceed further.”); Ellis v. Henning, 678 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(“A trial judge’s expression of dissatisfaction with counsel or a client’s behavior alone does not give rise to a reasonable belief that the trial judge is biased and the client cannot receive a fair trial.”), review denied, 699 So. 2d 1373 (Fla.1997). See generally 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So. 2d 244 (Fla.1997); see also Kopel v. Kopel, 832 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring in denial of rehearing en banc), review denied, 848 So. 2d 1154 (Fla.2003).2

Prohibition denied.

. Particularly the parts supplied only by the respondent.

. It is unnecessary to resolve the separate, substantial issue of the timeliness of the motion for disqualification below. See Fla. R.Jud. Admin. 2.160(e).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Schmelzer v. Frankel (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
    …nds are inappropriate comments by the trial court warranting disqualification. However, Schmeltzer does not highlight the trial court’s comments a few pages later during the same colloquy. See generally Camacho v. Kendall Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 872 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (noting that the court must review all relevant parts of the record, not just the portions presented by petitioner). Here, reviewing the transcript a few pages after the highlighted colloquy, the trial court expressly all…
  • …er credibility. The record before us demonstrates that the challenged actions of the lower tribunal did “not stem, as the petitioner contends, from any disqualifying personal bias or prejudice towards her.” Camacho v. Kendall Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 872 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (citation omitted). Rather, the court efficiently resolved a pending motion so as to avoid permitting the case “to ‘drift aimlessly through the system.’” Fleischer v. Fleischer, 217 A. 3d 1028, 1034 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (c…

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