MICHAEL A. PUSKAC, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A habitual felony offender sentence is illegal if the predicate convictions used for habitualization were not sequential.
Appellant challenged his habitual felony offender sentence, arguing the predicate convictions were not sequential. This issue was previously raised an…
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PER CURIAM.
Michael Puskac appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, which raised two claims. We affirm as to the first issue without comment.
In the second claim of error, Puskac argues his habitual felony offender sentence is illegal since the predicate convictions used to habitualize him were not sequential. Based on this court’s holding in Richardson v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1716, — So. 2d-, 2003 WL 21697171 (Fla. 4th DCA July 23, 2003), supplemented on reh’g, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D215 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan.14, 2004) we agree. While this issue was raised and rejected in a prior motion for postconviction relief, denying the instant claim, in light of the recent holding in Richardson, would result in manifest injustice. See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla.2003).
As such, we reverse the summary denial as to this issue alone and remand. As we did in Richardson, the State may introduce evidence of other qualifying convictions which would allow for a habitual felony offender sentence, should any exist. Additionally, we again certify conflict with McCall v. State, 862 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and subsequent cases from the Second District Court of Appeal.
FARMER, C.J., WARNER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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Moore v. State, 944 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…would be sufficient to constitute the third offense, this conviction was neither listed nor relied upon at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, we reverse Moore’s sentence for Count I, and remand to the trial court for re-sentencing. Puskac v. State, 872 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (on remand, State has the right to introduce evidence of other qualifying convictions). STEVENSON, C.J., and STONE, J„ concur.…
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Petruny v. State, 884 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…te convictions used to habitualize him were not sequential. See Richardson v. State, 2003 WL 21697171, 884 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA July 23, 2003), supplemented on reh’g, 2003 WL 21697171, 884 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan.14, 2004); Puskac v. State, 872 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). As the record supports his claim, we reverse and remand. On remand, the state may introduce evidence of other qualifying convictions which would allow for a habitual felony offender sentence, should any exist. See Puskac, 872 So…
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Ingram v. State, 943 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…her grounds, Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.2001); § 775.084(3), Fla. Stat. The trial court did neither of the above. As a result, the sentence on Count II should be reversed and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Puskac v. State, 872 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), quashed on other grounds, No. SC04-988, 2006 WL 2827606, — So. 2d - (Fla. Oct. 5, 2006). Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part and Remanded for Resentencing. GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Antoine L. McBRIDE, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003)
- McCALL v. State, 862 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)