NEIL ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2004-06-02
No. 4D02-4513
WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
873 So. 2d 1278 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Neil Anderson challenges his conviction for robbery and aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge against a black juror without a race-neutral reason supported by the record. The appellate court reverses, finding that the prosecutor's stated justification was not supported by the juror's actual responses during voir dire.


Holding

The court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's stated explanation for striking the juror was not supported by the record and therefore did not satisfy the requirement to provide a facially race-neutral reason. The court found the juror's actual responses did not support the prosecutor's characterization of her answers.


Headnotes

[1] A prosecutor must provide a facially race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike when challenged by the defendant.

[2] A trial court must ensure that the record supports the race-neutral reason provided by the prosecution for a peremptory strike.

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Key Quotes

“It was the state's obligation, when the defendant objected to the peremptory strike, to provide a facially race-neutral reason which is supported in the record.”

Establishes the legal standard for justifying peremptory challenges when race discrimination is alleged

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Facts & Procedural History

During jury selection, the prosecutor questioned a black female juror about her ability to convict based on witness testimony, presenting hypothetical…

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Opinion of the Court
KLEIN, J.

KLEIN, J.

Appellant, convicted of robbery and aggravated assault, argues that we should grant a new trial because the trial court erred in allowing the state to exercise a peremptory challenge to a black juror where no race-neutral reason was given. We reverse. ' :

During voir dire the prosecutor questioned a black juror, attempting to ascertain whether she could convict based on the testimony of one witness whom she believed, if there was contradictory testimony from three witnesses, and she indicated she would “go with who [she] believed.” She gave the same response when the prosecutor changed the hypothetical to one witness whom she believed compared to ten who told a different story. The prosecutor then went on as follows:
[State]: I’m not expecting you to have to do that. But if you believe that one person — let’s say you only hear from one person and you believe that A happened, and that A constitutes a crime. Would you have a problem finding the person guilty?

[Juror]: I don’t know. It depends on the situation. It’s very difficult. You’re not giving me any facts so I can’t tell you whether I would find the person guilty.

[State]: You believe the person, so regardless of what the facts are, you believe them to be true. And the Judge would instruct you if you find those facts, plug them into the wall, it would constitute a crime.

We’re going beyond what the facts are based on just one person’s word. " If you believe that one person, would you be able to find the person guilty?

[Juror]: Yes.

[State]: Is there any difference between the first scenario of one and three and the second scenario in your mind of just one person testifying?

[Juror]: Well,- there is a difference because three people saying this is what happened, people are stating it and there’s one person that states that this happened—

[State]: Again, you already believe the 1/10 scenario. There’s no difference to you then?

[Juror]: No

[State]: Does anybody disagree. There’s obviously a difference. I’ve heard from four people and I can make a decision. Anybody feel that way?

The state then exercised a peremptory strike on this juror and, following the defendant’s objection that it was racially based, the state explained:

I’ll be happy to answer. Ms. Campbell is the individual I specifically questioned as far as whether or not she would believe one person versus four people, one versus ten people, or one person alone. She could not tell me why she could make a difference based upon she would believe one person over ten but not one person’s testimony alone. She said it would be hard for her to do that and she would be uncomfortable.

Appellant responded that that was not a proper reason because the juror hadn’t heard any evidence. The court announced it was of the opinion that the explanation was race neutral and permitted the strike without further explanation.

It was the state’s obligation, when the defendant objected to the peremptory strike, to provide a facially race-neutral reason which is supported in the record. Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 320 (Fla.2002). We acknowledge that some of the answers given by the juror are not entirely clear; however, we attribute that to the awkward manner in which some of the questions were phrased. Considering the answers in light of the questions, this record does not support the state’s explanation that this prospective juror could believe “one person over ten but not one person’s testimony alone.” Nor did she say it would be “hard for her to do that and she would be uncomfortable.” We must accordingly reverse. White v. State, 754 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). We find the remaining issues to be without merit. Reversed for a new trial.

WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.


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Cited By

  • Artisan Pictures, Inc. v. W. Ave. Films, LLC, 882 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
    …PER CURIAM. After entering the judgment against the appellant which was affirmed in Artisan Pictures, Inc. v. West Avenue Films, 873 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), the trial judge assessed attorney’s fees and costs against it under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2001). On the authority of Visoly v. Security Pacific Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), that order is now* likew…
  • Carlton DOE v. State, 980 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
    …sonable and agreed to hold the state to a reasonable doubt standard. If a peremptory strike is based on faulty answers to awkward questions, the explanation for the strike may be considered unreasonable in some circumstances. See Anderson v. State, 873 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that the prosecutor’s race neutral reason for striking an African-American prospective juror was not supported by the record and noting that the juror’s unclear answers to the prosecutor’s questions were attributab…

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