MICHAEL WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Williams was convicted of drug paraphernalia possession after police discovered a crack pipe and cocaine during an encounter in a vacant lot. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed Williams's conviction, holding that the officer converted a consensual encounter into an unlawful investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion, making the evidence subject to suppression.
The court reversed the conviction, holding that the officer's actions—shining a flashlight in Williams's face, approaching with hand on weapon, and directing him to stand—converted the consensual encounter into an investigatory stop that lacked reasonable suspicion, making the evidence suppressible.
[1] Appellate courts review a trial court's findings of fact for deference but review the application of law to those facts de novo.
[2] A consensual encounter between a person and law enforcement becomes an investigatory stop when a reasonable person would not feel free to end the encounter and depart.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A consensual encounter becomes an investigatory stop "if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounter and depart."”
Establishes the legal standard for determining when a consensual encounter becomes an unlawful stop
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeputy Cordero encountered Williams sitting alone on a sofa in an empty lot known as a neighborhood hangout at 8:00 p.m. Williams was not initially su…
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STEVENSON, J.
Michael Williams was tried by jury and convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, Williams challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress cocaine and a crack pipe. In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, this court must afford deference to the trial court’s findings of fact, but reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts. See, e.g., Backus v. State, 864 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). With these principles in mind, we reverse the order appealed.
Evidence at the suppression hearing established that at about 8:00 p.m., Deputy Cordero encountered the defendant in an empty lot known as “the Hole,” an area frequently utilized as a neighborhood hang-out. The defendant was sitting alone on an old leather sofa and was not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing at the time he was first observed by the officer. According to the officer, when he first noticed Williams, Williams’ head was down and he was focused on his lap. When the deputy was ten to fifteen feet away, he shined his flashlight on Williams. The deputy noticed that Williams’ left hand was clenched in a fist. Williams then lifted his left leg and tossed the item in his fist under his leg, returning his hand to his lap. Cordero testified that these actions “threw him off’ and “kind of put [him] on guard” because he didn’t know if Williams had a weapon and the area was known for weapons. The deputy took a step back, placed his hand on his weapon, and continued to approach Williams, asking him to stand. When Williams stood, the deputy discovered a crack pipe and suspect crack cocaine.
With this evidence before it, the trial court concluded that the evidence was seized during the course of a consensual encounter and, therefore, was not subject to suppression on the ground that the deputy lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. We disagree. A consensual encounter becomes an investigatory stop “if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounter and depart.” Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla.1993). We find that a reasonable person would not feel free to end the encounter and to leave under circumstances where an officer shines a flashlight in his or her face, approaches with his hand on his weapon, and directs him or her to stand. See Williams v. State, 694 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(flnding that officer’s request that defendant pull his waistband forward converted consensual encounter to stop); Johnson v. State, 610 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(holding that officer’s instructing the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets and to turn around so that he could look at him rendered contact with police a stop). Since the contraband in the instant case was discovered as a consequence of a stop that was not supported by reasonable suspicion, the evidence should have been suppressed.
The State urges us to uphold the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress by assérting that the contraband was discovered as a consequence of a legitimate weapons pat-down. It is true that if, during the course of what began as a consensual encounter, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the defendant is armed and dangerous, then a weapons pat-down is justified. See Johnson v. State, 785 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). We do not believe that, here, the facts support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and posed a threat to the safety of the deputy or to others. See Ruddack v. State, 537 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Currens v. State, 363 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Indeed, the deputy himself acknowledged that he simply “didn’t know” what had been in Williams’ fist.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in denying Williams’ motion to suppress, we accordingly reverse his conviction.
WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Blake v. State, 939 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…as not the functional equivalent of a stop). In some instances, however, if a spotlight or flashlight is utilized in conjunction with other actions by an officer, a consensual encounter may convert into an investigatory stop. See Williams v. State, 874 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (explaining that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave under circumstances where an officer shines a flashlight in his or her face, approaches with his hand on his weapon, and directs him or her to stand); State v. New…
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State v. Goodwin, 36 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…vehicle and shining flashlight inside was not functional equivalent of a stop). Like these courts, we find that the initial encounter in this case was consensual as well. This case is distinguishable from our previous holding in Williams v. State, 874 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). There, we found that “a reasonable person would not feel free to end [an] encounter and to leave under circumstances where an officer shines a flashlight in his or her face, approaches with his hand on his weapon, and directs hi…
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Smith v. State, 925 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…ed in section 901.151(5), probable cause means reasonable belief or suspicion. Id. at 824-25. Therefore, if the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, then a weapons pat-down is justified. Williams v. State, 874 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA2004). Appellant contends that the pat-down was unconstitutional because the deputy did not have any particularized information that the appellant was armed and dangerous. We disagree. In this case, appellant was armed with a stick…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Backus v. State, 864 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Johnson v. State, 610 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Amin Ruddack v. State, 537 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Currens v. State, 363 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Johnson v. State, 785 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Williams v. State, 694 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)