PHILLIP DUFFY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Phillip Duffy appealed the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence for capital sexual battery. The trial court imposed a life sentence without the mandatory minimum twenty-five years before parole eligibility required by Florida statute. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing to include parole eligibility after twenty-five years.
The court held that the trial court erred in imposing a life sentence without the mandatory provision that the defendant serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole as required by section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993). The sentence must be corrected to include this parole eligibility requirement.
[1] A defendant is entitled to be sentenced under the most lenient version of a statute in effect at the time of the offense, applying the rule of lenity.
[2] A life sentence for capital sexual battery, imposed under the 1993 version of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, must include eligibility for parole after serving no l…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court was required to impose the life sentence mandated by section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), as well as the provision for parole eligibility after serving no less than twenty-five years”
Establishes the mandatory sentencing requirements the trial court must follow for capital sexual battery
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuffy was charged with capital sexual battery occurring between October 2, 1998, and October 1, 1995. He was found guilty by jury on April 24, 2001. T…
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FULMER, Judge.
Phillip Duffy appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.800(a). We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Duffy was charged by information with one count of capital sexual battery, occurring between October 2, 1998, and October 1, 1995. He was found guilty as charged by a jury on April 24, 2001. In his motion, Duffy claimed that his sentence for capital sexual battery was illegal because the court imposed a life sentence without imposing the mandatory minimum twenty-five years with eligibility for parole, as required by section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1991). Duffy cites to the 1991 statutes and erroneously states that the time frame alleged in the information commenced in 1992 instead of 1993. This error is of no significance because section 775.082(1) remained unchanged in 1993. In 1995, section 775.082 was amended to eliminate the possibility of parole for capital crimes that do not result in punishment by death. Ch. 95-294, § 4, Laws of Fla. Under the rule of lenity, Duffy was entitled to be sentenced under the 1993 version of the statute because it was the more lenient. See Cairl v. State, 833 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Gilbert v. State, 680 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
In its order, the trial court denied Duffy’s motion “based upon the contents of the State’s Response.” In its response, the State acknowledged that Duffy correctly quoted the provisions of section 775.082(1), but asserted that the “second part of the statute which reads, ‘shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole,’ does not set a cap on the amount of time a defendant may serve under a life sentence, rather it simply establishes a floor.”
The trial court erred by adopting the State’s interpretation of section 775.082(1). The trial court was required to impose the life sentence mandated by section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), as well as the provision for parole eligibility after serving no less than twenty-five years. See Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 954 (Fla.1981) (holding that punishment of life imprisonment with a requirement that defendant serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole is an automatic sentence for capital sexual battery and the court has no discretion); Johnson v. State, 679 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (reversing a life sentence without the possibility of parole for capital sexual battery as in excess of that authorized by the legislature).
We therefore reverse and remand for Duffy’s sentence to be corrected to reflect his eligibility for parole after completion of the twenty-five year minimum mandatory term.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
CASANUEVA and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Wilkinson v. State, 889 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ble for parole after serving twenty-five years. Wilkinson’s sentence was automatic—the court had no discretion. See Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 954 (Fla.1981); Johnson v. State, 679 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We note that in Duffy v. State, 874 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), this court reversed and remanded the denial of a motion to correct illegal sentence and instructed the trial court, on remand, to specifically reflect the defendant’s eligibility for parole upon completion of the twenty-five year…
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Robinson v. State, 955 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…ge, except in one respect. We agree with Appellant that, based on the law applicable to his case, he is eligible for parole on the capital sexual battery conviction after serving a minimum mandatory twenty-five-year term. [*1231] See Duffy v. State, 874 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Among other things, Appellant was convicted of sexual battery on a person under 12 years of age. The information alleged that the offense occurred on September 24, 1994. In 1994, section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994),…
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Williams v. State, 8 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…PER CURIAM. The denial of appellant’s rule 3.850 motion is affirmed. Nevertheless, based on the date of appellant’s offenses, it appears he is in fact eligible for parole. See Duffy v. State, 874 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Hurd v. State, 807 So. 2d 753, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Johnson v. State, 679 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Dolan v. State, 618 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Although he has no absolute right to parole, he is entitled to pro…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981)
- Cairl v. State, 833 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Gilbert v. State, 680 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Donnell Johnson v. State, 679 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)