JEREMY BILLY VARGAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2004-06-09
No. 2D04-194
CASANUEVA, SALCINES, and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
875 So. 2d 726 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 19 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Jeremy Billy Vargas challenges the order of the trial court denying as facially insufficient his motion for DNA testing filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. We affirm without prejudice to any right Vargas might have to file a timely, facially sufficient 3.853 motion in accordance with the time limitations outlined in that rule, or within sixty days from the date of the issuance of the mandate in this case should this be the later date. See Saffold v. State, 850 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that a rule 3.853 motion that does not contain at least some information as to the primary evidence against the movant and any defense employed at trial, does not provide a facially sufficient statement to meet the requirements of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) of the rule).

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SALCINES, and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.


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  • Kynyodda Deonne Jones v. State, 922 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …te, 835 So. 2d 1221, 1222 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that the time for filing a Rule 3.850 motion “is not tolled by other collateral proceedings filed in the trial court, even if a corrected sentence is entered”) (as cited in Pierce v. State, 875 So. 2d 726, 727 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). Jones’s comparison to a petition for writ of certiorari filed in the Supreme Court is unpersuasive. While a petition for writ of certiorari tolls the time for filing collateral proceedings, such as Rule 3.850 motions,…
  • O'Neill v. State, 6 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …be corrected at any time, and it would make no sense to allow a judgment to be attacked many years after the expiration of the two-year deadline simply because a sentence was corrected pursuant to a rule 3.800(a) motion.”); see also Pierce v. State, 875 So. 2d 726, 727 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (noting the difference between cases “involvefing] re-sentencing on direct appeal” and cases such as Joseph [*631] involving “re-sentencing following a post-conviction motion”). Accordingly, we reverse the order on ap…
  • Carlile Breland v. State, 58 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …exceptions. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). But the two-year period in the rule does not commence until both the conviction and the sentence become final, which occurs upon issuance of the mandate in the direct review proceedings. See Pierce v. State, 875 So. 2d 726, 729 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Cook v. State, 596 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Indeed, until the direct appeal is concluded, the trial court is without jurisdiction to consider a rule 3.8…

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