RONALD FRAZIER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ronald Frazier appealed his convictions and sentences, arguing trial court errors in conduct of the trial and in sentencing. The Florida appellate court affirmed his convictions and his robbery sentence but vacated and remanded his sentences for carjacking and attempted murder, finding that concurrent equal sentences under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and Violent Career Criminal Act violated statutory sentencing requirements.
The trial court properly conducted the Nelson and Faretta inquiries and did not abuse its discretion regarding the juror's note-taking request. The sentencing for robbery with a firearm was proper, but the concurrent equal sentences for carjacking and attempted first-degree murder violated statutory sentencing requirements and must be reconsidered on remand.
[1] A trial court may not impose concurrent sentences under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and the habitual felony offender statute if the sentences are equal, as this is…
[2] A trial court may impose a sentence under the Violent Career Criminal Act that is greater than a sentence imposed under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 775.082(8)(e) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration”
Establishes the statutory limitation that concurrent sentences under habitual felony offender and PRR statutes must be greater, not equal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrazier was convicted of robbery with a firearm, two counts of carjacking with a firearm, and attempted first-degree murder with a firearm. He was sen…
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PER CURIAM.
We find no merit to appellant’s arguments that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Nelson inquiry1 and Faretta hearing2 or that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a juror’s request to take notes during the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
The appellant also argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to concurrent minimum mandatory life sentences as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) and a violent career criminal. We disagree as to his sentence for robbery with a firearm but agree as to his sentences for two counts of carjacking with a firearm and attempted first degree murder with a firearm.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000), held that although concurrent sentences as a PRR anda habitual felony offender did not violate double jeopardy, the imposition of such sentences did violate the PRR act itself. Citing to Walls v. State, 765 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the court stated:
[BJecause “section 775.082(8)(e) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act’s] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration,” a trial court is “without authority to sentence [a defendant to an equal sentence] under the habitual felony offender statute,” even where such sentence is imposed concurrently with the PRR sentence. Thus, the trial court erred in imposing two concurrent, equal sentences in this case, not because such sentencing violated double jeopardy, but because it is not authorized by the Act.
Id. at 659; Bloodworth v. State, 790 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla.2001); Martin v. State, 813 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Watts v. State, 789 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
Thus, pursuant to Grant, the appellant was properly sentenced for robbery with a firearm, a first degree felony. Under the PRR Act, a first degree felony is punishable by thirty (30) years imprisonment. See § 775.082(8)(a)2.b., Fla. Stat. (1997). As a violent career criminal, however, the appellant faced life imprisonment for this first degree felony. See § 775.084(4)(c)l., Fla. Stat. (1997). Since this life sentence as a violent career criminal was greater, the trial court’s imposition of the same was not error. The trial court’s imposition of the concurrent life sentences for the two counts of carjacking was error because the sentence for each carjacking conviction under both the PRR Act and the Violent Career Criminal Act is life. As the State properly concedes, pursuant to section 775.082, a court may impose a concurrent sentence under section 775.084 only if it is a greater sentence. Since these sentences are equal, the appellant must be resen-tenced on these counts. See Rodriguez v. State, 863 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Martin v. State, 813 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Bromell v. State, 777 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Likewise, the appellant needs to be re-sentenced for his conviction of attempted first degree murder with a firearm. Pursuant to section 777.04(4)(b), an attempted capital felony is a first degree felony but not a felony punishable by life. In this case, however, since the jury found that the appellant used a firearm, the crime is reclassified as a life felony pursuant to section 775.087(l)(a). Consequently, his sentence under the PRR Act and Violent Career Criminal Statute would be life and thus equal. Therefore, he must also be resentenced for this conviction as well.
Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s conviction and sentence for robbery with a firearm. However, we vacate his sentence for two counts of carjacking and one count of attempted first degree murder and remand for resentencing.
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.
. See Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
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McDONALD v. State, 957 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2007)…oncurrently with a lesser mandatory minimum sentence under section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000) (the 10-20-LIFE statute). Second, the Fourth District certified conflict with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Frazier v. State, 877 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), on the issue of whether the mandatory sentence for first-degree robbery with a firearm under the PRR statute is thirty years or life in prison.1 As we explain, we approve the Fourth District’s decision in McDonald. We hold (1) th…1 / 2
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McDONALD v. State, 912 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…), Fla. Stat. (2000). McDonald claims that under the PRR statute the mandatory sentence for robbery with a firearm is thirty years in prison. § 775.082(9)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (2000). McDonald relies on the Third District’s decision in Frazier v. State, 877 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (stating that robbery with a firearm is punishable by thirty years in prison under the PRR). We disagree and certify conflict with the decision in Frazier. Our supreme court has held that the PRR statute requires a mandatory life…
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Ballester v. State (Fla. 6th DCA 2025)
Authorities Cited (13 total)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- Walls v. State, 765 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Pearman v. State, 777 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Shelton Bromell v. State, 777 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Bloodworth v. State, 790 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2001)
- Watts v. State, 789 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Chance v. State, 813 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)