YI LIN ZHANG, AND LAN HUA HUANG, APPELLANTS,
v.
D.B.R. ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., APPELLEE
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In a commercial landlord-tenant dispute, the trial court granted summary judgment finding that tenants' restaurant menu did not violate a restrictive use clause and awarded them construction contribution costs. The court denied the tenants' request for attorney's fees, finding the parties had settled and neither was a prevailing party, which the appellate court affirmed.
The trial court properly determined that the tenants did not violate the restrictive use clause and awarded construction contributions of $25,459.20. However, the trial court did not err in denying attorney's fees and prejudgment interest because the parties had effectively settled the dispute and neither party qualified as a prevailing party for fee-award purposes.
[1] A trial court may determine that neither party has prevailed in a contract action when compelling circumstances exist.
[2] The prevailing party for attorney's fees is determined by the result obtained on significant issues in the litigation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The "prevailing party" for purposes of awarding attorney's fees is the party determined by the trial court to have prevailed on significant issues in the litigation.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining prevailing party status in fee-award cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLandlord D.B.R. Asset Management, Inc. sued tenants Yi Lin Zhang and Lan Hua Huang for eviction and damages, alleging they violated a restrictive use …
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PER CURIAM.
This case involves a commercial landlord-tenant action for possession and damages. Appellee, D.B.R. Asset Management, Inc. (“landlord”), brought suit for eviction and damages claiming the tenants, appellants Yi Lin Zhang and Lan Hua Huang (“tenants”), violated a restrictive “use clause” in their lease agreement by selling various kinds of Chinese food at their restaurant. The tenants answered and filed a counterclaim alleging the landlord owed them $30,367.36 in construction contributions under a separate provision of the lease, and also owed them an additional $24,540.80 in rent credits.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motions, the parties argued their respective positions regarding whether the tenants’ menu offerings at the restaurant violated the restrictive clause. With regard to the counterclaim, the landlord argued the tenants were not entitled to a construction contribution based upon their breach of the restrictive use clause. However, the landlord agreed that if no violation were found, the proper amount due would be $25,459.20, but not the $50,000 construction allowance sought by the tenants. The landlord stated it did not wish to evict the tenant.
Thereafter, the trial court granted summary final judgment against the landlord finding the tenants’ use did not violate the restrictive clause. The tenant was awarded $25,459.20 in construction contribution costs. With regard to attorneys’ fees, the order specified that “[ejach side shall bear their own fees and costs.” The tenant then filed a motion for rehearing seeking prejudgment interest on the construction contribution claim, as well as legal fees and costs.
Rehearing was granted. However, the trial court denied the tenants’ request for prejudgment interest, legal fees, and costs, specifically finding that “although the Court procedurally granted Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff, this disposition was based upon an agreement between the parties. This Court therefore finds that this case was resolved by way of a settlement. There is no prevailing party in a settled case.” In a subsequent order on the tenants’ motion for reconsideration, the trial court again determined “there is no ‘prevailing party’ in this action.”
The “prevailing party” for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees is the party determined by the trial court to have prevailed on significant issues in the litigation. See Moritz v. Hoyt Enter., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla.1992); Green Cos. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv., Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). In making the determination as to which party has prevailed, a trial court is to focus on the “result obtained.” See Smith v. Adler, 596 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Simply because a party has obtained some economic benefit as a result of litigation, does not necessarily mean that party has succeeded on the major issue in the case. See Zaremba Florida Co. v. Klinger, 550 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Thaller v. Waterford Condo. Apartments, Inc., 437 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
Moreover, “an attorney’s fee award is not required each time there is litigation involving a contract providing for prevailing attorney’s fees.” KCIN, Inc. v. Canpro Inv., Ltd., 675 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). A trial court may properly determine that neither party has prevailed in a contract action under compelling circumstances. See Miller v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 820 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
Here, the trial court determined the parties had settled, and specifically found there was no prevailing party for purposes of entitlement to fees. The record supports the trial court’s findings that the parties did agree to a resolution of the disputed issues. Significantly, although the tenants’ use was found not to violate the restrictive clause in the lease, the landlord did prevail in defense of the counterclaim that sought an excessive amount for the construction contribution.
Under these circumstances, clearly there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s well reasoned decision. See Folta v. Bolton, 493 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1986); Miller v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 820 So. 2d at 438. Accordingly, we affirm the orders below in all respects.
Affirmed.
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Granoff v. Seidle, 915 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…2d 596, 597 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (citation omitted). The “prevailing party” is the party that prevails on the significant issues in the litigation. See Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla.1992); Zhang v. D.B.R. Asset Mgmt., Inc., 878 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). The focus of the trial court in making the determination should be on the “result obtained.” See Zhang; Smith v. Adler, 596 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The trial court has no discretion to deny costs under this statute — the…1 / 2
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LOY v. LOY, 904 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…DCA 1996). A trial court may properly determine that neither party has prevailed in a contract action under compelling circumstances. See Miller v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 820 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Zhang v. D.B.R. Asset Management, Inc., 878 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); see also Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 687 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). As matters stood after the trial court entered its judgment, the father owed an arrearage of $16,500 plus interest. The father appealed, arguing th…
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Moccia, 258 So. 3d 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)…. Smith v. Adler, 596 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Depending on the results obtained, a “court may properly determine that neither party has prevailed in a contract action under compelling circumstances.” Zhang v. D.B.R. Asset Mgmt., Inc., 878 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Here, although Borrowers were successful in having the Bank’s foreclosure action involuntarily dismissed, the Bank was also successful in having the Deed Agreement enforced against Borrowers. In other words, the litigation…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1992)
- Folta v. Joseph Bolton, M.D., 493 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1986)
- The Green Cos., Inc. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv., Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Kcin, Inc. v. Canpro Invs., Ltd., 675 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Zaremba Fla. Co. v. Joan and Barbara Klinger, 550 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Smith v. Adler, 596 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Brent C. Miller, Charles M. Rand, & Miller & Rand, P.A. v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 820 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Thaller v. Waterford Point Condo. Apts., Inc., 437 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)