TROY E. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a sentencing court has discretion to impose special probation conditions related to rehabilitation or public protection, even for offenses committed before the effective date of a statute specifically authorizing such conditions.
[1] A sentencing court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions related to rehabilitation or public protection.
[2] Statutes authorizing specific probation conditions for offenses committed on or after a certain date do not prohibit imposing those conditions for offenses committed prio…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was sentenced for attempted capital sexual battery with special probation conditions related to sex offenses. He argued these conditions wer…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Discretion Of Sentencing Court cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in which he sought to have special conditions of probation stricken from his sentence. As this claim lacks merit, we affirm.
On July 14, 1999, the appellant was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment followed by 7 years of probation for two counts of attempted capital sexual battery that occurred on February 28, 1986. The court imposed as special conditions of probation the conditions set forth in section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), relating to sex offenses. The appellant alleges that the trial court erred in imposing these conditions because the statutes in effect at the time the appellant committed his offenses did not authorize those conditions.
Although the statutory language of section 948.03(5)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), requires the imposition of these conditions for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995, nothing in the statutory language prohibits imposing these conditions for offenses occurring pri-or to October 1, 1995. Indeed, section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1985), specifically authorizes the court to impose any conditions of probation that it considers proper. Furthermore, sentencing courts are endowed with broad discretion to impose various conditions of probation as long as they are related to rehabilitation or the protection of the public. See Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Dearth v. State, 390 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
A review of the special conditions imposed in the present case reveals that each is properly related to the appellant’s rehabilitation or the protection of the public in light of the appellant’s convicted offenses. Because the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in imposing these special conditions upon the appellant’s probation, his claim of an illegal sentence was properly denied.
AFFIRMED.
ALLEN, VAN NORTWICK and BROWNING, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Spano v. State, 60 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ondition, but the trial court did not rule on it, so it is deemed denied. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B). The trial court abused its discretion in imposing a special condition that Spano have no contact with her daughter. See Williams v. State, 879 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (applying abuse of discretion standard to “[a] review of the special conditions imposed”). The discretion to impose a special condition of probation or community control “is not unbridled.” Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800,…
-
Montoure v. State, 880 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…[*794] PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from Appellant’s judgment and sentence. We affirm the trial court’s imposition of sex offender conditions of probation without discussion. See Williams v. State, 879 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Because the trial court erred in scoring Appellant’s out-of-state conviction as a level seven offense, we reverse. Appellant was convicted of lewd and lascivious molestation. When calculating Appellant’s scoresheet, the trial…
-
Howell v. State, 933 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Williams v. State, 879 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). STEVENSON, C.J., STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Dearth v. State, 390 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)