J. C. PATTERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
S. D. CRENSHAW, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1933-05-24
Davis, C. J. and Whitfield and Teerell, J. J., concur., Elus and BrowN, J. J., dissent.
110 Fla. 310 Florida Supreme Court (1933) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 148 So. 543
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Patterson purchased a tax certificate and filed to foreclose the lien, seeking recovery of the certificate's face value plus subsequent taxes paid. The trial court sustained a demurrer claiming the amount sought violated Florida tax certificate redemption statutes, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a certificate holder need not allege payment of the certificate's face value to recover that amount in foreclosure.


Holding

A tax certificate holder may recover the face value of the certificate without alleging payment of that amount for the certificate. The demurrer should have been overruled because this Court has previously determined that such allegations are not necessary.


Key Quotes

“This contention is not tenable, as has heretofore been determined by this Court in the case of Ridgeway v. Reese, 100 Fla. 1304, 131 Sou. 136; and Ridgeway et al. v. Peacock, Clerk, 100 Fla. 1297, 131 Sou. 140, Poekel v. Dowling, 101 Fla. 1174, 132 Sou. 838 and Tax Securities Corporation v. Boland, 103 Fla. 63, 137 Sou. 151.”

Establishes that prior precedent supports the principle that a tax certificate holder need not allege payment of the certificate's face value to recover that amount.

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Facts & Procedural History

Patterson became the owner of a tax certificate by purchase and assignment. He filed a bill of complaint to foreclose the lien evidenced by the certif…

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Opinion of the Court
Buford, J.

Buford, J.

In this case the appellant became the owner, by purchase and assignment, of a certain tax certificate. He filed bill of complaint to foreclose the lien evidenced by the certificate. It was alleged that he was the owner and holder of the certificate and has paid all subsequent and omitted taxes and seeks to foreclose the lien to enforce the payment of the amount of the face, of the certificate, together with the amount of the subsequent and omitted taxes paid by him in the aggregate sum of $1,119.46.

A demurrer was interposed to the bill and sustained upon the 7th, 8th and 9th grounds of demurrer. They are as follows:

*311“7. It does not appear from the allegations of said Bill that the amount of One Thousand One Hundred Nineteen ($1,119.46) and Forty Six One Hundreths Dollars, which the Complainant avers is required to redeem said lands, is in anyway justifiable in law or in equity under any of the terms or conditions of Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929, Laws of Florida.
“8. It affirmatively appears from the Bill, that the amount of $1,119.46 which Complainant avers is necessary to redeem the lands involved in this suit is in direct conflict with both the letter and spirit of the Statute governing this action, to-wit: Chapter 14572 Acts of 1929, Laws of Florida.
“9. It appears affirmatively from the allegations of the Bill of Complaint, that the Complainant in this case is seeking to impos'e upon the Defendant an arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust, inequitable and illegal penalty for redemption of the lands involved in this suit.”

Appellee has not favored us with a brief, although appellant's brief was filed April 23, 1932. We assume from the contents of appellant’s brief that the contention was made in the court below that the complainant should not be allowed to recover the amount of the face of the tax certificate unless it was alleged that he had paid that amount for the certificate. This contention is not tenable, as has heretofore been determined by this Court in the case of Ridgeway v. Reese, 100 Fla. 1304, 131 Sou. 136; and Ridgeway et al. v. Peacock, Clerk, 100 Fla. 1297, 131 Sou. 140, Poekel v. Dowling, 101 Fla. 1174, 132 Sou. 838 and Tax Securities Corporation v. Boland, 103 Fla. 63, 137 Sou. 151.

The demurrer should have been overruled.

The order appealed from is reversed.

Davis, C. J. and Whitfield and Teerell, J. J., concur.

Elus and BrowN, J. J., dissent.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Lang v. Quaker Realty Corp., 131 Fla. 179 (Fla. 1938)
    …ree sub-paragraphs heretofore quoted, must be determined in part adversely to the contention of the appellants. Appellee contends that the answer to the question as presented by [*185] the first sub-paragraph is to be found in Patterson v. Crenshaw, 110 Fla. 310, 148 Sou. 543, and the cases there cited, and also in the later case of Capital Finance Corporation v. Giles, et al., 110 Fla. 527, 149 Sou. 585. It was well settled that the holder of the tax certificate bought from and assigned by the proper offic…
  • …was not pleaded in this case. This disposes of the first question. The third question is definitely answered in the opinions and judgments in the cases of Capital Finance Corporation v. Giles, 111 Fla. 527, 149 Sou. 585, and Patterson v. Crenshaw, 110 Fla. 310, 148 Sou. 543, and cases there cited in which it was held: [*796] “Assignee could foreclose tax sale certificate, issued to State, for face value thereof together with subsequent taxes paid by assignee, notwithstanding assignee obtained certificate…
  • The Lyon Co. v. Phoenix Tax Title Corp., 126 Fla. 243 (Fla. 1936)
    …p. v. Giles, 111 Fla. 527, 149 Sou. Rep. 585.” In the case of Capital Finance Corp. v. Giles, cited above, we reversed the order dismissing the bill of complaint on authority of the opinion and judgment in the case of Pat [*246] terson v. Crenshaw, 110 Fla. 310, 148 Sou. 543. In that case we said: “We assume from the contents of appellant’s brief that the contention was made in the court below that the complainant should not be allowed to recover the amount of the face of the tax certificate unless it was…

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