LORELYN EVANS AND THOMAS EVANS, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF MIRAMAR, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of the City of Miramar in a vehicle collision case. Mrs. Evans' car was struck by a city emergency vehicle proceeding through a red light, and the court found genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment despite the city's statutory emergency vehicle privilege.
The court held that although Florida law grants emergency vehicle drivers a privilege to proceed through red lights when responding to emergencies, this privilege does not relieve drivers of the duty to exercise due regard for the safety of all persons. Material factual questions remain regarding whether the city driver should have seen Evans' vehicle and whether he proceeded with due regard for safety, precluding summary judgment.
[1] Summary judgment is precluded when issues of material fact exist sufficient to require a trial.
[2] Drivers of authorized emergency vehicles may proceed past red signals or stop signs, but only after slowing down for safe operation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of a vehicle specified in paragraph (a) from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for the safety of others.”
Florida statute establishing that emergency vehicle privilege does not eliminate fundamental duty of care and due regard for safety
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Evans was driving on Pembroke Road in the curb lane when the traffic light turned green and she entered a busy intersection. A City of Miramar em…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse a final summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, City of Miramar. The record reflects issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Mrs. Evans’ vehicle collided with a City of Miramar emergency vehicle, an SUV, that was proceeding through a red light at a busy intersection. According to Evans, she was driving on Pembroke Road when the light turned green and entered the intersection from the curb lane which was free of traffic. The city vehicle struck Evans’ car. The vehicles in the other lanes had stopped to let the city vehicle pass. The driver of the city vehicle testified that he had put on his lights and siren, and entered the intersection, because he heard a radio dispatch that there was a fire in the area.
Section 316.072, Florida Statutes, governing obedience to traffic laws, includes a privilege, which provides:
(5) Authorized emergency vehicles.—
(a)l. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to a fire alarm, but not upon returning from a fire;
(b) The driver of a vehicle specified in paragraph (a), except when otherwise directed by a police officer, may:
2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
3. Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as the driver does not endanger life or property;
4. Disregard regulations governing direction or movement or turning in specified directions, so long as the driver does not endanger life or property.
(c) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of a vehicle specified in paragraph (a) from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for the safety of others.
We recognize that there is substantial deposition evidence favorable to the city, including testimony that the driver of the city vehicle had used his lights and siren, and was stopped or had slowed down, before proceeding through the intersection. There remains, however, some question as to whether he should have seen Mrs. Evans’ vehicle and whether he proceeded into Mrs. Evans’ lane with due regard for safety of persons approaching in that lane.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mrs. Evans, as the non-moving party, a fact issue remains. The summary judgment is, therefore, reversed and remanded for trial.
FARMER, C.J., STONE and MAY, JJ„ concur.