WATY RYLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the appellant stated a facially valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding speedy trial rights, requiring further proceedings.
[1] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is facially valid when the defendant alleges deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent…
[2] A trial court cannot summarily deny a post-conviction relief motion based on the record when the record does not conclusively refute the defendant's allegations of entitl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant sought post-conviction relief, alleging his trial counsel failed to file a notice of expiration of speedy trial time. This inaction allegedl…
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WOLF, C.J.
Appellant, Waty Ryland, appeals from the denial of his rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief which asserted nine grounds. The trial court summarily denied the motion, holding that all claims were either procedurally barred or conclusively refuted by the record. We affirm as to all but one of the grounds raised.
Appellant’s seventh ground alleged that his trial counsel failed to file a notice of expiration of speedy trial time and that his trial occurred well after the 175-day period prescribed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. He also alleged that his co-defendants were arrested and charged after his speedy trial period began and that his trial counsel inexplicably failed to demand a speedy trial. He alleged that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s inaction because it (1) precluded his discharge; (2) allowed the state to broker a deal with a co-defendant, which resulted in detrimental testimony against him; and (3) allowed him to be tried with co-defendants who also provided prejudicial testimony. Nothing in the record attached by the trial court “conclusively shows either that the delay was attributable to any action on the part of appellant or that appellant was otherwise not entitled to discharge under Rule 3.191.” Burke v. State, 855 So. 2d 207, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Because appellant specifically alleged a deficient performance of his counsel and that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the absence of the deficient performance, appellant has stated a facially valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
As to all grounds raised except the seventh, the trial court’s order is affirmed. As to this ground, the order is reversed and remanded with directions either to attach portions of the record conclusively refuting appellant’s entitlement to relief or to hold an evidentiary hearing.
. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED with directions.
KAHN and LEWIS, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Renato R. Remak, Jr. v. State, 142 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…e’s case within the recapture window would have been diminished so severely that there is a reasonable probability that the movant would have been acquitted or convicted of a lesser crime if the State had been forced to proceed, see Ryland v. State, 880 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing summary denial where the movant “alleged that his co-defendants were arrested and charged after his speedy trial period began” and that “he was prejudiced by his counsel’s inaction because it (1) precluded his dis…
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Tavares Antonio McDUFFIE v. State, 77 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…CA 2006); State v. Clifton, 905 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). We reverse and remand, finding that the appellant stated a legally sufficient basis for relief in his motion. See, e.g., Gee v. State, 13 So. 3d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ryland v. State, 880 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). [*849] We do not reach the appellant’s claim that the lower court erred by appointing counsel against his wishes, and thus do not decide whether there is a right to self-representation in post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g.,…
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Pita v. State, 926 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for an evidentiary hearing or for the attachment of record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief. See Ryland v. State, 880 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.…
Authorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Burke v. State, 855 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)