S.D., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
S.D. was convicted of domestic battery under Florida law. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove the required intent element because appellant's angry arm-swinging created a substantial certainty of contact with the victim.
The conviction was affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to prove intent because S.D.'s angry, flailing arm motions created a substantial certainty that her mother would be struck, which satisfies the intent element of battery under Florida law.
[1] A conviction supported by competent, substantial evidence will not be reversed on appeal.
[2] Sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existe…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.”
Establishes the standard of review for denials of motions for judgment of acquittal
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.D. became angry and engaged in physical altercations, first fighting with her brother and then slapping her sister. She then struck her mother in th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Elements Of Battery cases and more on FLexlaw
GROSS, J.
We affirm appellant’s conviction for domestic battery in violation of section 741.28(2), Florida Statutes (2002).
We reject appellant’s contention that the trial judge should have granted her motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove that she intended to commit domestic battery.
In Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court summarized the standard of review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal:
In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo standard of review applies. Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction which is supported by competent, substantial evidence. If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.
Id. at 803 (citations omitted).
The elements of battery are met when a person: “1. Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or 2. Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” § 784.03(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). Intent to commit a battery must be determined by the circumstances surrounding the touching or striking of the victim. See Mohansingh v. State, 824 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that there was competent substantial evidence to support a conviction of battery for spitting on an officer when testimony indicated that the defendant was angry and screaming, he admitted to giving the officer a “raspberry,” and spittle was found on the officer’s uniform); C.C. v. State, 576 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (finding that defendant’s actions of cursing and threatening the victim before the battery occurred and the amount of force used was sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that he possessed the requisite intent for the crime). In this case, in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence was that appellant was angry and flailing her arms about.- She had just finished fighting with her brother and had slapped her sister before she hit her mother in the mouth. The mother testified that appellant saw her coming near and continued swinging her arms. From the description of the manner in which appellant was swinging her arms, a substantial certainty existed that the mother would be hit as a result of appellant’s actions.
It is this substantial certainty of a touching or striking that satisfies the intent element of battery and distinguishes this case from C.B. v. State, 810 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In that case there was not a substantial certainty that a lighter, which the defendant threw to the floor, would bounce and hit a teacher. AFFIRMED.
FARMER, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
N.H.M. v. State, 974 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ntionally touching or striking another person against the will of the other or intentionally causing bodily harm to another. See § 784.03(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006); see also Khianthalat v. State, 935 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); S.D. v. State, 882 So. 2d 447, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Strictly speaking, the simple use of the word “force” does not encompass an intentional touching without consent or the intentional infliction of bodily harm. In Wilson v. State, 786 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the Fou…
-
Emerson J. Pinkney v. State, 74 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…e evidence established that the defendant threw the lighter at the floor and that it only hit the teacher “because of a crazy bounce,” the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for battery. Id. Similarly, the defendant in S.D. v. State, 882 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), asserted that the State failed to prove she intentionally hit her mother. The evidence showed that the defendant was angry and was flailing her arms around. She had just finished fighting with her brother and had slapped her sis…
-
Bonge v. State, 53 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…to another person. Intent is an element of battery. Beard v. State, 842 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The intent to commit a battery is determined by the circumstances surrounding the touching or the striking of the victim. Id.; S.D. v. State, 882 So. 2d 447, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Given the specific facts of this case, which were admitted by the State below, the State could not establish that Bonge intended to touch his infirm and elderly mother against her will when he lifted her from her wheelchair…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2002)
- Shayne Mohansingh v. State, 824 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- C.B. v. State, 810 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- C.C. v. State, 576 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)