JOHN C. CARRAWAY, JR., PETITIONER,
v.
CLINTON ADAM CARRAWAY, RESPONDENT
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A probate court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a personal representative's petition for discharge while a pending appeal challenged the personal representative's qualifications. The court held that granting discharge would interfere with the appellate court's authority to decide the merits of the qualification dispute.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the petition for discharge because doing so would impinge on the appellate court's power to decide the pending appeal regarding the personal representative's qualifications. The trial court was prohibited from entering any order on the final accounting and petition for discharge until the appeal was resolved.
[1] A pending appeal does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to enter further orders unless those orders interfere with the subject matter of the appeal or impinge upo…
[2] A trial court may proceed with matters unrelated to the subject of a pending appeal, provided its actions do not affect or interfere with the appeal's subject matter.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The mere fact that the order relating to the appointment of the personal representative was on appeal does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to enter any further orders or judgment in the case, so long as the trial court does not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal or impinge on the power and authority of the district court to decide the issue presented to it on appeal.”
Establishes the general rule that trial courts retain jurisdiction during appeals unless their actions interfere with the appellate court's authority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn C. Carraway, Jr. filed an appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to revoke the personal representative and petition for appoin…
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PER CURIAM.
John C. Carraway, Jr., petitioner, petitions this court for a writ of prohibition, seeking to prohibit the trial court from ruling on a petition for discharge in a probate proceeding. Petitioner argues that there is a pending appeal in this court of the trial court’s order denying his motion to revoke the personal representative and petition for appointment of successor personal representative. After this appeal was filed, respondent filed a notice of final accounting and petition for discharge. Petitioner objected, contending that the trial court did not have jurisdiction while the appeal was pending. The trial court eventually held that it had jurisdiction but had not issued a written order on the petition for discharge.
The mere fact that the order relating to the appointment of the personal representative was on appeal does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to enter any further orders or judgment in the case, so long as the trial court does not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal or impinge on the power and authority of the district court to decide the issue presented to it on appeal. See Finst Dev., Inc. v. Bemaor, 449 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). If what the trial court does while the appeal is pending cannot affect or interfere with the subject matter of the appeal, then the trial court can act. See Bailey v. Bailey, 392 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); see also Jordon v. State, 631 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Section 733.901(2), Florida Statutes (2003), specifically bars a subsequent action against a personal representative upon the discharge of the personal representative. Although section 733.903 and Florida Probate Rule 5.460(a) allow further administration of the estate if it is required for any reason, Florida case law appears to only permit the reopening of an estate after the discharge of the personal representative where there were procedural irregularities or facts constituting fraud or bad faith. See, e.g., Dacus v. Blackwell, 90 So. 2d 324 (Fla.1956); Dean v. Bentley, 848 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
In the present case, the pending appeal involves the issue of the qualifications of the personal representative. The trial court is considering, during the pendency of this appeal, the final accounting and petition for discharge filed by the personal representative which petitioner seeks to disqualify. The trial court’s granting of the petition for discharge would impinge on the power and authority of this court to decide the issue presented to it on appeal. If the trial court acts on the petition to discharge the personal representative, then the substantive controversy is decided. This would sufficiently prejudice petitioner unless petitioner can later successfully reopen the estate. At this time, the record does not show that petitioner can maintain a successful claim to reopen the estate if the trial court grants the petition to discharge.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted. The lower tribunal is hereby prohibited from entering an order on the notice of final accounting and petition for discharge of the personal representative until the appeal pending in this court is resolved.
PETITION GRANTED.
BOOTH, POLSTON and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Leila Williams v. Williams, 337 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…rial court that, under the circumstances present here, no precedent exists to reopen an estate that was fully administered and discharged over 60 years ago. See Hannan v. Doyle, 337 So. 3d 1258, 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (citing Carraway v. Carraway, 883 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) for the proposition that “Florida case law appears to only permit the reopening of an estate after the discharge of the personal representative where there were procedural irregularities or facts constituting fraud or bad fa…
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Hannan v. Doyle (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)…1st DCA 2018) (recognizing that, absent allegations of fraud by concealment or other wrongful acts, section 733.901 generally bars suits against a personal representative after the discharge of the personal representative); Carraway v. Carraway, 883 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“Section 733.901(2), Florida Statutes (2003), specifically bars a subsequent action against a personal representative upon the discharge of the personal representative. Although section 733.903 and Florida Probate Rule 5…
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Northland Ins. v. S&M Transp. (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2016)…2d 199 (Fla. 1998). “[T]he test . . . is whether the trial court is proceeding in a matter which affects the subject matter on appeal.” Casavan v. Land O’Lakes Realty, Inc. of Leesburg, 526 So. 2d 215, 215-16 (Fla. 1988). In Carraway v. Carraway, 883 So. 2d 834, 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), the petitioner objected to the trial court ruling on a petition for discharge, arguing that the pending appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to do so. “The trial court eventually held that it had jurisdiction . .…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bailey v. Bailey, 392 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Dacus v. Blackwell, 90 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1956)
- Finst Dev., Inc. v. Bemaor, 449 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Jordon v. State, 631 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Dean v. Bentley, 848 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)