RICHARD A. MEYERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the appellant did not qualify for sexual predator designation because he lacked the statutorily required prior offense.
Richard Meyers was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery and designated a sexual predator. The State admitted Meyers did not have a prior statutori…
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FULMER, Judge.
Richard A. Meyers appeals the order designating him as a sexual predator pursuant to section 775.21(4)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2001). He argues that he did not qualify for sexual predator designation and that the Florida Sexual Predator Act vio lates procedural due process. We agree that Meyers did not qualify for sexual predator designation and reverse.
Meyers was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery, a second-degree felony in violation of section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (2001). An offender convicted of a violation of section 800.04 as a second-degree felony shall be designated a sexual predator if the offender has previously been convicted of or found to have committed, or pled nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, any of certain statutorily enumerated offenses. § 775.21(4)(a)(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); Garcia v. State, 827 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Nicholas v. State, 844 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). The State admits that Meyers did not have the required previous offense. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with directions to remove the sexual predator designation.
Our reversal of the trial court’s order makes it unnecessary for us to address Meyers’ argument that the Florida Sexual Predator Act violates procedural due process. However, we note that this court has previously held that the Act does not violate procedural due process. See Milks v. State, 848 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), review granted, 859 So. 2d 514 (Fla.2003).
Reversed and remanded with directions.
SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Lupianez v. State, 909 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…105, 110 [*601] (Fla.2002) (“[I]n cases where the current offense is less serious, the sexual offender can still be designated a sexual predator, if the offender also has prior felonies. See § 775.21(4)(a)l.b., Fla. Stat. (2000).”); Meyers v. State, 884 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that violation of section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (2001) — a second-degree felony — -did not result in sexual predator designation when defendant had no prior violations). In this case, Lupianez did not have the req…
Authorities Cited
- Milks v. State, 848 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Nicholas v. State, 844 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Lionardo Garcia v. State, 827 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)