THEODORE KONIOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Theodore Konior appeals his convictions for sexual battery, burglary, and aggravated battery. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial judge was obligated to recuse himself after making an off-the-record statement that the defendant deserved a life sentence if convicted, creating a reasonable fear of prejudgment that tainted the entire proceeding.
The trial judge was obligated to grant Konior's motion to disqualify himself because his statement that Konior deserved a life sentence if convicted, made prior to hearing any evidence, created a reasonable fear of prejudgment. A judge who predetermines the appropriate sentence is disqualified from presiding over the entire proceeding, not merely sentencing. Konior's immediate oral motion for disqualification at the start of trial was legally sufficient.
[1] A judge who makes a statement indicating a predetermined sentence is disqualified from presiding over the entire proceeding.
[2] A defendant's reasonable fear of prejudgment due to a judge's statement about a predetermined sentence is a legally sufficient reason for disqualification.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Konior's resulting fear that he had been prejudged and would not receive a fair trial before Judge Rapkin was reasonable and was a legally sufficient reason for Judge Rapkin's disqualification.”
Establishes that the defendant's fear of prejudgment based on the judge's pre-trial statement constituted valid grounds for recusal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn the morning of trial, Konior's attorney and the prosecutor informed the judge they had negotiated a plea agreement. The trial judge, Harry M. Rapki…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prejudgment Of Case cases and more on FLexlaw
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
A jury convicted Theodore Konior of sexual battery, burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery, and aggravated battery causing great bodily harm to a person over 65 years of age. He challenges his convictions on several grounds. We need not detail them all because the first error about which he complains entitles him to a new trial.
On the morning of Konior’s trial, his attorney and the prosecutor advised the trial judge, Harry M. Rapkin, that they had negotiated a plea agreement. Judge Rapkin rejected the agreement and, in an off-the-record comment, proclaimed that if Konior were found guilty of the charges he deserved a life sentence. Konior’s counsel orally moved to disqualify Judge Rapkin, but the judge summarily denied the motion and the trial proceeded. After the jury convicted him, Konior filed written motions for a new trial and to disqualify Judge Rapkin from sentencing him. The judge denied these motions. He sentenced Konior to life in prison on the burglary count, to thirty years’ imprisonment for the aggravated battery, consecutive to the life sentence, and to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the sexual battery, concurrent with the aggravated battery sentence.
We are constrained to reverse Konior’s convictions and sentences because Judge Rapkin was obliged to grant Konior’s first motion to disqualify him. On that occasion Judge Rapkin declared, prior to hearing any evidence, that if Konior was convicted he deserved a life sentence. Konior’s resulting fear that he had been prejudged and would not receive a fair trial before Judge Rapkin was reasonable and was a legally sufficient reason for Judge Rap-kin’s disqualification. See Martin v. State, 804 So. 2d 360, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Lewis v. State, 530 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
We reject the State’s suggestion that we should parse the judge’s remarks and hold that Konior’s fear was reasonable only as to sentencing. Florida’s courts have frequently held that a judge who has made statements indicating that he or she has predetermined the appropriate sentence is disqualified from presiding over the entire proceeding. See, e.g., Martin; Torres v. State, 697 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Hayes v. State, 686 So. 2d 694, 695-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
The State’s authority to the contrary, Lewis, 530 So. 2d 449, is distinguishable. In that case, the judge made remarks similar to those at issue here just prior to jury selection. But the defendant waited until after his conviction before moving to disqualify the judge “with respect to the sentencing phase.” Id. at 449.
When reversing only for resentencing, the First District noted that “the appellant does not assert error in the trial judge’s presiding at trial — only in the judge’s presiding at the sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 450.
In contrast, Konior sought Judge Rapkin’s disqualification at the start of trial, immediately upon learning of the judge’s statement.
Moreover, unlike Lewis, Konior contends that he was, in fact, thereafter denied a fair trial on several grounds which, as previously stated, we need not reach. We also disagree with the State’s assertion that Konior’s motion for disqualification was ineffective because, the State contends, it was not “promptly reduced to writing” as required by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(e). See Stockstill v. Stockstill, 770 So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that written motion filed slightly more than ten days after trial at which party’s' counsel made unsuccessful oral motions to disqualify judge for her conduct during trial was timely under the rule).
We reverse Konior’s convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial before a different judge. Because Konior is to be retried, we must rule on his complaint about the jury instructions given at the first trial. We have examined the issue and determined that it is without merit.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
WHATLEY and COVINGTON, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Ballard, 956 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…llard’s case. The State’s fear that Judge Roberts had prejudged the question of the appropriateness of the death penalty was thus a reasonable fear, and that fear was a legally sufficient reason for the judge’s disqualification. See Konior v. State, 884 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Pierce v. State, 873 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Accordingly, Judge Roberts should have entered an order disqualifying herself in Mr. Ballard’s case. Conclusion For these reasons, we grant the petition for writ of…
-
Robenson Kersaint v. State, 15 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…that the trial judge had prejudged the sentence to be imposed. Florida’s courts have held that disqualification is required where a judge “has made statements indicating that he or she has predetermined the appropriate sentence....” Konior v. State, 884 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Thompson v. State, 990 So. 2d 482 (Fla.2008); Dorch v. State, 952 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); State v. Ballard, 956 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA…
-
Carter v. State, 138 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…ionally, in a factually similar case from the Second District, a trial judge rejected a negotiated plea agreement on the morning of trial and stated that if the defendant was found guilty of the charges, he deserved a life sentence. Konior v. State, 884 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Notwithstanding the fact that the comments were made during a plea hearing, the Second District held that the defendant’s “resulting fear that he had been prejudged and would not receive a fair trial” before the trial judge…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ferguson v. State, 633 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Hayes v. State, 686 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Leponyon Jacob Lewis v. State, 530 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Martin v. State, 804 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Singletary v. Tatol, 697 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Roldolfo Torres v. State, 697 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Bruner Scott Stockstill v. Stockstill, 770 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)