CHARLES E. MCBRIDE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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McBride appeals the denial of his motion to correct a 30-year habitual felony offender sentence imposed in 1992, arguing under Blakely v. Washington that a jury must determine the existence of prior convictions before a sentence can be enhanced. The Fourth District affirmed, holding that Blakely does not apply to recidivism statutes and does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
Blakely does not entitle a defendant to have a jury determine whether he has the requisite predicate convictions for a habitual felony offender sentence. Additionally, Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
[1] The Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. …
[2] The Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[Ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime ... must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Establishes the general Apprendi rule regarding jury determination of facts that increase criminal penalties, which McBride invoked.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1992, McBride was convicted by jury of burglary of a dwelling. The trial court imposed a 30-year sentence under Florida's habitual felony offender …
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TAYLOR, J.
In 1992, a jury found Charles E. McBride guilty of burglary of a dwelling. Subsequently, the trial court imposed a thirty-year prison sentence under the habitual felony offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes. McBride appeals the denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion to correct sentence, wherein he challenged the habitual offender sentence under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). McBride contends that his sentence is illegal because the jury did not determine whether he had the requisite prior convictions for the enhanced sentence.
In Blakely, the Supreme Court revisited Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and extended its application to sentencing guidelines schemes which allow judges to depart upward based on certain facts and circumstances surrounding the criminal offense. In Apprendi, the Court held that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime ... must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.
We previously held that Apprendi does not apply to recidivism statutes and entitle a defendant to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of predicate convictions necessary for imposing a habitual felony offender sentence. See Gordon v. State, 787 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In Gordon, we concluded that Apprendi did not overrule Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980), wherein our state supreme court rejected “the notion that a defendant was entitled to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the predicates necessary for imposition of a habitual felony offender sentence.” Gordon, 787 So. 2d at 894.
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit held that Blakely, like Apprendi, does not require a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a sentencing court to enhance a sentence. United States v. Marseille, 377 F. 3d 1249, 1258 n. 14 (11th Cir.2004)(“We have reviewed Blakely and conclude that it is inapposite.... [Tjhough the district court found that Marseille had prior convictions, Blakely does not take such fact-finding out of the hands of the courts.”). The Eleventh Circuit has also concluded that Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. In re Dean, 375 F. 3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.2004)(“Regardless of whether Blakely established a ‘new rule of constitutional law1 ... the Supreme Court has not expressly declared Blakely to be retroactive to cases on collateral review.”). Without an express declaration by the Supreme Court, Blakely cannot be applied retroactively. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001)(explaining that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.”).
We likewise hold that Blakely does not entitle a defendant to have a jury determine whether he has the requisite predicate convictions for a habitual felony offender sentence. We further hold that Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to correct his sentence.
FARMER, C.J., and GROSS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (50 total)
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Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2007)…CA) (holding that because Apprendi does not apply retroactively, neither does Blakely), review denied, 917 So. 2d 193 (Fla.2005); Burrows v. State, 890 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (same), review denied, 914 So. 2d 952 (Fla.2005); McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (same). Nevertheless, we have traditionally held that “resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.” Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324, 334 (Fla.2001) (quoting Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 7…
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Burrows v. State, 890 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…e Eleventh Circuit, in its opinion in In re Dean, 375 F. 3d 1287 (11th Cir.2004), relied on Schriro to conclude that the Supreme Court has not made Blakely retroactive to cases on collateral review. Recently the Fourth District, in McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), held that, like Apprendi, “Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.” We agree. CONCLUSION Since Burrows did not seek further appellate review of this court’s affirmance on direct appeal, his sen…
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Burgal v. State, 888 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Blakely v. Washington, — U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).…
Previewing 3 of 50 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004)
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (U.S. 2001)
- United States v. Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Gordon v. State, 787 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- In re Will C. Dean, Jr., 375 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2004)