L.N.D., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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L.N.D. appealed the denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle stop. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based solely on its presence near a previously burglarized business at 3:30 a.m.
The officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop. Being in an area of past criminal activity during late and unusual hours, without additional articulable facts, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
[1] An investigative stop of a vehicle is not justified by reasonable suspicion when the officer's sole basis for the stop is that the vehicle was observed exiting from behin…
[2] Mere presence in an area with a history of criminal activity during late or unusual hours is insufficient, on its own, to establish a founded or reasonable suspicion for…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“being in an area of past criminal activity during late and unusual hours is not enough to justify a founded or reasonable suspicion”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that the court applied to reverse the lower court's denial of the suppression motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer stopped a vehicle at 3:30 a.m. after observing it emerge from behind a closed business that had been burglarized one or two weeks prior. No…
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FULMER, Judge.
L.N.D. entered a plea of no contest to the charges of resisting an officer without violence and possession of paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress evidence. We reverse because the State did not carry its burden of showing that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify the investigative stop of a car in which L.N.D. was a passenger. At the motion to suppress hearing, the officer testified that he stopped the vehicle after he observed it coming out from behind a closed business at 3:30 a.m. The business “had been burglarized or had had a series of burglaries in the past week or two weeks.” However, there was no report of a burglary that night. When asked what the factual basis was for the stop, the officer stated that “[t]he vehicle was in an area at that time when most normal citizens aren’t there and I wanted to determine what his presence — what he was doing there.” The officer indicated that he suspected the vehicle occupants of committing a burglary.
The question here is whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. Case law indicates that being in an area of past criminal activity during late and unusual hours is not enough to justify a founded or reasonable suspicion. See Errickson v. State, 855 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that no founded suspicion existed for stop of defendant who was sitting on a curb next to a bicycle and a payphone in front of a closed gas station that had been burglarized numerous times); Batson v. State, 847 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding there was no founded suspicion to stop vehicle near recently burglarized home at 2 a.m.); Ippolito v. State, 789 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding there was no reasonable suspicion for stop based on it being late at night and in area of past criminal activity); see also Silverman v. State, 610 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (holding that vehicle being in area where burglaries frequently occurred would not constitute grounds for a stop); Abraham v. State, 532 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding there was no founded suspicion for stop where defendant was driving out of parking lot behind a closed insurance company at 3 a.m. and picked up a female walking away from the business); cf. State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that investigatory stop was justified where defendant was riding a bicycle in a commercial “high burglary” area at 6 a.m. carrying a sack with squared off items that looked like appliances).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to grant the motion to suppress and discharge L.N.D. Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hill v. State, 51 So. 3d 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…ich is underscored by the use of the canine unit. Even when construed in a light most favorable to the State, the circumstance identified by the officer as prompting the stop was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion. See L.N.D. v. State, 884 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Errickson v. State, 855 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Accordingly, we reverse. The State argues on appeal that police obtained reasonable suspicion to stop appellant’s vehicle after appellant engaged in “headlong flight.” Head…
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Berry v. State, 973 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…iminal activity.” Daniels v. State, 543 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Case law indicates that walking behind a closed business in the evening is insufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, e.g., L.N.D. v. State, 884 So. 2d 515, 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car in which the defendant was a passenger when the officer saw the vehicle come out from behind a closed building at 3:30 a.m. and the building had been recen…
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Wilburn Thomas v. State, 144 So. 3d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…nsistently and repeatedly held that a person’s mere presence in an area known for past criminal activity or near a closed business during late-night hours does not provide the founded or reasonable suspicion necessary to stop a ear. L.N.D. v. State, 884 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (and numerous cases cited therein); see also Hill v. State, 51 So. 3d 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Both officers who observed the people behind the business testified that they saw nothing criminal about their activities. The pat…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Sokol v. Stardancer Casino, Inc., 855 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Ippolito v. State, 789 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Batson v. State, 847 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Abraham v. State, 532 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Silverman v. State, 610 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)