LOUIS TEMPLEMAN, PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Citator

Cited By

• State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007)
  …levant. The second conflict is the district court’s holding that “mere unwanted touching” does not “involve the use or threat of use of physical force or violence.” That holding conflicts with cases from other courts of appeal. See Jenkins v. State, 884 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); State v. Crenshaw, 792 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Spann v. State, 772 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Branch v. State, 790 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We resolve these c…

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• Walker v. State, 965 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
  …a law enforcement officer and battery on a firefighter. We remand for the trial court to strike the PRR designation from Walker’s sentences on those two offenses. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. KELLY and CANADY, JJ., concur. . 884 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (finding that a defendant's battery on a law enforcement officer was a qualifying offense for sentencing as a PRR where the defendant intentionally touched or struck an officer against the officer’s will and created a well-…
• Spradlin v. State, 967 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
  …ery statute to determine whether BOLEO is a felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence. They simply assume that BOLEO satisfies this description. One judge, however, did analyze the issue in some depth. In Jenkins v. State, 884 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), although the majority followed its decision in Branch [v. State, 790 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ], the dissent argued that BOLEO cannot be a [*378] qualifying offense under the PRR statute because it is not necessarily a for…