STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY PAWLE, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a postconviction court's decision granting Anthony Pawle relief from his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel regarding credit for time served. The court reverses because the postconviction court's order lacks evidentiary support, but remands for a new hearing at which Pawle must be represented by counsel.
The postconviction court's order is reversed because it is not supported by substantial, competent evidence—the only evidence presented was trial counsel's testimony, which did not support a finding of affirmative misadvice. The case is remanded for a new evidentiary hearing at which Pawle must be represented by counsel.
[1] A postconviction court's order granting relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported by substantial, competent evidence.
[2] A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief when the plea colloquy does not refute the allegation of affirmative misadvice con…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the plea colloquy does not refute the allegation of affirmative misadviee about the amount of jail credit that Pawle would receive because jail credit was never discussed during the plea colloquy.”
Establishes that the lack of discussion about jail credit in the plea colloquy prevented the trial court from refuting misadvisement claims.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePawle filed a postconviction motion claiming trial counsel affirmatively misadvised him about credit for time served. After this court reversed an ini…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SALCINES, Judge.
The State appeals from an order granting Anthony Pawle’s motion for postcon-viction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In that order, the postconviction court granted Pawle the opportunity to withdraw his plea based upon a finding that the plea was involuntary due to the misadviee of counsel. We reverse and remand.
Pawle’s motion for postconviction relief asserted that trial counsel affirmatively misadvised him concerning credit for time served. This is the second time that this court has examined this claim. The post-conviction court initially summarily denied Pawle’s claim and he appealed. This court reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing stating that “the plea colloquy does not refute the allegation of affirmative misadviee about the amount of jail credit that Pawle would receive because jail credit was never discussed during the plea colloquy.” Pawle v. State, 861 So. 2d 1174, 1174-75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
On remand, the postconviction court, in essence, found that Pawle could have mis understood how his credit for time served was to be applied and granted Pawle relief on that basis. The State appeals that ruling.
At the evidentiary hearing on remand, Pawle did not present any evidence and, instead, attempted to introduce his own testimony in the questions he asked during cross-examination of his trial counsel. The only proper evidence before the postcon-viction court was the testimony of trial counsel — testimony which did not support a finding that Pawle had been affirmatively misadvised. Because the postconviction court’s order is not supported by substantial, competent evidence, we must reverse. See Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997) (opining as to standard of review regarding a trial court’s ruling on a rule 3.850 motion following an evidentiary hearing).
However, as argued by Pawle’s appointed appellate counsel, we must remand this matter for another evidentiary hearing at which Pawle is to be represented by counsel. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 801 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (listing factors to consider when determining whether a defendant should be afforded counsel at a postconviction hearing). Pawle repeatedly requested appointment of counsel but his requests were denied. Although the subject matter of the evidentiary hearing was not complex and would not necessarily lead to the appointment of counsel in all such cases, other facts demonstrated the need for counsel in the present case.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
CASANUEVA, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge; Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Jackson v. State, 908 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…presenting his case and cross-examining his prior counsel. Therefore, as in Williams and Lee, because there was doubt about the need for counsel, reversal and remand for appointment of counsel and a new hearing is required. See also State v. Pawle, 884 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Toro v. State, 833 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). We reject the other issues raised on appeal and affirm the denial of all claims other than the claims that were previously addressed at the evidentiary hearing. Affirmed in part…
Authorities Cited
- Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1997)
- Johnson v. State, 801 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Pawle v. State, 861 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)