LAMONICA BROWN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Lamonica Brown petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to withdraw a recusal order and reinstate a Rule 3.850 relief order. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal denied the petition, holding that the 17-month delay in seeking mandamus was unreasonable and that the judge properly recused himself to maintain judicial impartiality.
The court denied the mandamus petition on two grounds: (1) the 17-month delay in seeking mandamus relief exceeded reasonable temporal bounds applicable to extraordinary writs, and (2) the judge properly exercised his discretion in recusing himself to maintain public confidence in judicial impartiality and vacating his earlier order.
[1] A petition for writ of mandamus must be sought within a reasonable time frame, particularly when equitable principles govern.
[2] A trial judge's voluntary recusal is appropriate when the judge believes their impartiality or independence may be compromised, or when an appearance of impropriety exist…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not 'coldly neutral,' impartial, and independent.”
Establishes the standard requiring judges to maintain impartiality and the propriety of recusal when that standard is threatened
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter an evidentiary hearing, Judge Whitehead granted Ms. Brown's Rule 3.850 motion for a new trial. At a bench conference that same day, Judge Whiteh…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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MONACO, J.
Lamonica Brown petitions this court seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus to require the trial judge to withdraw an order recusing himself from consideration of her case, and requiring the trial court to rescind an order vacating an earlier order granting Rule 3.850 relief.1 We deny the petition.
The facts are straight forward. After an evidentiary hearing the originally assigned trial judge, Judge Whitehead, granted Ms. Brown’s Rule 3.850 motion, and ordered a new trial. At a bench conference the same day, however, Judge Whitehead announced that he was going to recuse himself because he had been approached in church by one of Ms. Brown’s relatives, apparently seeking favorable treatment for Ms. Brown. The State immediately filed a motion to disqualify Judge Whitehead, and argued that he should also withdraw the order granting the Rule 3.850 relief. Judge Whitehead granted the motion, and rescinded the earlier order. A new judge was assigned, and although we have not been made aware of its status, the case is apparently still pending below.
Meanwhile, seventeen months passed. Ms. Brown now seeks the mandamus relief earlier referenced.
Rule 9.100, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure, governs appellate extraordinary relief, including mandamus. Although that rule contains no specific time limit within which mandamus must be sought, it seems clear that a petitioner must act within reasonable temporal bounds. Cf. Estate of Carlton v. Rogers, 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.Ct. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980).
This is particularly true since mandamus is governed by equitable principles. See State ex rel. Davis v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 415 (Fla.1970).
We have previously held that the thirty-day time limit applicable to seeking certiorari under Rule 1.630(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, does not apply to mandamus, because mandamus is often sought to compel the rendition of an order. See Milanick v. Town of Beverly Beach, 820 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Under those circumstances it would be illogical to apply a thirty day limitation. In the present case, however, in which the petitioner is seeking mandamus seventeen months after the re-cusal order is entered, relief is being sought in a time frame that is well in excess of the envelope of reasonability. On this ground alone a denial of the petition is justified.2
Perhaps more importantly, however, Judge Whitehead did exactly what he should have done under the circumstances. By his actions he sought to maintain the confidence of the public in the impartiality of the judiciary, as he was required to do. See Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861-864, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988).
As the Florida Supreme Court has noted, “no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not ‘coldly neutral,’ impartial, and independent.” See Seay v. State, 286 So. 2d 532, 544 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847, 95 S.Ct. 84, 42 L.Ed.2d 77 (1974).
If the trial judge felt his impartiality or independence was compromised, or if he concluded that there might be an appearance of impropriety, then his disclosure and recusal was appropriate. Deference should be given to the decision of a trial judge not to preside over a case. See Ingram v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 823 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
Once the judge concluded that he should voluntarily recuse himself from the case, vacating his earlier order, while perhaps not required, was certainly within his discretion.
PETITION DENIED.
SAWAYA, C.J., and SHARP, W., J., concur. . Mandamus will lie to correct a recusal based upon a mistaken determination that the premise for the recusal is sufficient. See Ingram v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 823 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); May Invs., Inc. v. Lisa, S.A., 814 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
. We note, as well, that a judge must rule on a motion to disqualify filed pursuant to Rule 2.160, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, ''immediately.” This term has been defined by the Florida Supreme Court to mean not later than 30 days after the presentation of the motion to the court. See Tableau Fine Art Group, Inc. v. Jacoboni, 853 So. 2d 299, 302 (Fla.2003).
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D.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 12 So. 3d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…So. 2d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). “[Ejvery litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.” State v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939); see Seay v. State, 286 So. 2d 532, 544 (Fla.1973); Brown v. State, 885 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). The trial court reversibly erred by denying the motion for disqualification. For these reasons, we are constrained to REVERSE the order terminating parental rights and to REMAND for further proceedings before a different tr…
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Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1988)
- Baltimore Rebuilders, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 447 U.S. 922 (U.S. 1980)
- In re Est. of Perry Carlton v. Rogers, 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1979)
- Seay v. State, 286 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1973)
- Tableau Fine ART Grp., Inc. v. Jacoboni, 853 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2003)
- Gilkerson v. Curry, 419 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1974)
- Chrisco v. United States, 419 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1974)
- Milanick v. Town OF Beverly Beach, 820 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- State of Fla. on the Relation of William Davis v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1970)
- MAY Invs., Inc. v. Lisa, S.A., 814 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)