EVELYN CHAPMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Evelyn Chapman appealed the denial of her motion to reduce her sentence, arguing that the sentencing court improperly included 120 points for victim injury even though she was not convicted of the homicide. The court held that victim injury points cannot be scored for offenses of which the defendant was not convicted, and vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration.
The court held that victim injury points must not be scored for an offense for which the offender has not been convicted. Because Chapman was not convicted of first-degree murder, the only charge associated with the death, the inclusion of 120 points for victim injury was improper.
[1] Victim injury points may not be scored for an offense for which the offender has not been convicted.
[2] An erroneous inclusion of victim injury points on a sentencing scoresheet is cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) if the error is ascertainable fr…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a "victim injury must not be scored for an offense for which the offender has not been convicted."”
Establishes the fundamental rule that victim injury points cannot be assessed for unconvicted offenses under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(d)(9)
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChapman was indicted for armed robbery and first-degree murder. Two of her accomplices were killed in a car accident while fleeing the robbery scene. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PETERSON, J.
Evelyn Chapman appeals the denial of her motion for sentence reduction pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), alleging that the sentencing court erred by assessing 120 points on her score-sheet for victim injury.
Chapman was indicted for armed robbery and first-degree murder. The homicide occurred when two of Chapman’s accomplices, Dufrane Amelia Khaleel and Fernando Rivas, were killed in an automobile accident while fleeing from the scene of the robbery. Khaleel was the driver of the automobile and Rivas was a passenger. Chapman entered a negotiated plea of no contest to the robbery and the State nolle prossed the murder charge. The negotiated plea included a “bottom of the guidelines” sentence and Chapman received 138 months in the Department of Corrections. This was the lowest permissible sentence according to Chapman’s scoresheet which included in the total score 120 points for victim injury for the death of Rivas.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(d)(9) provides that a “victim injury must not be scored for an offense for which the offender has not been convicted.” Section 921.0021(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), defines victim injury as a “physical injury or death suffered by a person as a direct result of the primary offense, or any additional offense for which an offender is convicted and which is pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense.” (Emphasis added.) Because Chapman was not convicted of first-degree murder, the only charge in which the death occurred, an imposition of points for victim injury was incorrect. See, e.g., Geary v. State, 675 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 680 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1996).
An erroneous inclusion of victim injury points is cognizable under rule 3.800(a) as long as the error is ascertainable from the face of the record. See, e.g., Long v. State, 853 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Reynolds v. State, 827 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Dickson v. State, 826 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Resolution of Chapman’s complaint should not entail more than the examination of the indictment, judgment, sentence, stipulation for settlement and scoresheet. We do not believe that an evidentiary determination is necessary to resolve the claim. Of course, the plea agreement could include Chapman’s acceptance of the sentence received in exchange for the nolle prosse of the murder charge and that is also easily determined by review of the agreement.
We vacate the order denying relief and remand for further proceedings to determine whether a denial or grant of relief is appropriate after further review of the pleadings.
ORDER VACATED; REMANDED.
SAWAYA, C.J., and MONACO, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Perez v. State, 20 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…ourt’s “dismissal” of his claim regarding the victim injury points. The erroneous assessment of victim injury points is a cognizable claim under rule 3.800(a), provided the error is apparent from the face of the record. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 885 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). There is no prohibition to the filing of successive rule 3.800(a) motions so long as the merits of the issue presented have not previously been addressed, and no time limit on the filing of rule 3.800(a) motions exists. See…
-
Delgado v. State, 948 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…ado of any crime against the person of Mr. Goyriena. Erroneous assessment of victim injury points is cognizable in a 3.800(a) motion and can be raised at any time as long as the error is discernible from the face of the record. See Chapman v. State, 885 So. 2d 475, 476, 477 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Daum v. State, 544 So. 2d 1035, 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Here, the information alleged no physical contact or injury against Jose Luis Goyriena, as it alleged no crime against his person, and therefore it was improper…
-
Delgado v. State, 997 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…Delgado of any crime against the person of Goyriena. Erroneous assessment of victim injury points is cognizable in a 3.800(a) motion and can be raised at any time as long as the error is discernible from the face of the record. See Chapman v. State, 885 So. 2d 475, 476-77 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Daum v. State, 544 So. 2d 1035, 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Here, the information did not allege injury to Goyriena. The issue then is whether the State can assess the eight victim injury points as to Goyriena. We will assu…
Authorities Cited
- Geary v. State, 675 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Dickson v. State, 826 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Southland Corp. & Kemper Ins. Grp. v. Crawford, 827 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Balkey v. State, 853 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Rubin Long v. State, 853 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)