PRESTON HENRY LONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Preston Henry Long appealed his probation revocation sentencing on two grounds: that the trial court erroneously sentenced him on a count for which he had already completed his sentence, and that the probation revocation order failed to specify the conditions violated. The State conceded error on both points, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing and amendment of the revocation order.
The court held that both errors were committed and reversible. The trial court erred in sentencing Long on the false imprisonment count because he was only charged with violating probation on the sexual battery count and had already served his sentence on the false imprisonment count. Additionally, the written probation revocation order was legally deficient for failing to state the conditions of probation violated, and must conform to the trial court's oral pronouncements at the revocation hearing.
[1] A trial court errs by sentencing a defendant on a count for which the defendant has already served the sentence and which was not included in the affidavit of violation.
[2] A written order revoking probation must state the specific conditions of probation that the defendant violated.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Clearly, this was error which must be remedied upon remand by resentencing appellant only on the count for which he was still on probation.”
Establishes that the trial court erred in sentencing Long on the false imprisonment count when only the sexual battery probation was at issue.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLong pleaded guilty to sexual battery and false imprisonment. After his third probation violation, he was sentenced to two-and-a-half years' imprisonm…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Sentencing Error cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Preston Henry Long, raises two sentencing claims in this direct appeal from his judgment upon violating probation. The State concedes error on both points, and we reverse and remand for resentencing.
The State initially charged appellant with one count of burglary, one count of sexual battery, and one count of false imprisonment. Appellant pled guilty to the sexual battery and false imprisonment counts and was placed on probation. After appellant’s third violation of probation, the trial court sentenced him to two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment on both counts and to five years’ probation on the sexual battery count. Upon his release from prison, appellant began to serve a period of five years’ probation on the sexual battery count. As to the false imprisonment count, appellant had already served all the time required of him. The State then charged appellant with violating the terms of his probation on the sexual battery count. At a probation revocation hearing, the trial court made oral findings that appellant had materially violated certain terms of his probation and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment with credit for all time previously served.
However, the judgment sentenced appellant to ten years’ imprisonment on both counts, rather than just the count of sexual battery. Appellant’s probation revocation order was silent as to the terms of probation he had violated. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and then filed a motion to correct sentencing errors pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), alleging that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a term of incarceration on the false imprisonment count and that the trial court erred in failing to make written findings in the order revoking appellant’s probation. Because the trial court did not rule on appellant’s 3.800(b)(2) motion within sixty days, the motion is deemed denied. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B); Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(f)(6)(A); Robinson v. State, 850 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
On appeal, appellant again raises both issues addressed in his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion.
Appellant’s first issue on appeal, as set forth in his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, is that the trial court erred by sentencing him on the false imprisonment count, which was not charged in the Affidavit of Violation and for which appellant had already served his sentence. Clearly, this was error which must be remedied upon remand by resentencing appellant only on the count for which he was still on probation. Cf. Fryson v. State, 559 So. 2d 377, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (citations omitted).
Appellant’s second issue on appeal is that the trial court’s written order revoking his probation is legally deficient because it failed to state the conditions of probation that appellant had violated.
We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand. See Williams v. State, 604 So. 2d 8, 9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“Written sentencing documents, including probation orders, must conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncements.”); see also Hamer v. State, 682 So. 2d 1221, 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Byrden v. State, 622 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Dantler v. State, 584 So. 2d 198, 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that the trial court’s formal written order finding a probationer in violation of the terms and conditions of probation must conform to the oral pronouncements at the revocation hearing and sentencing) (citations omitted).
On remand, the Order of Revocation shall be amended to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncements made during the hearing regarding the conditions of probation appellant had violated.
Accordingly, on account of these conceded sentencing errors, we REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing and amendment of the Order of Revocation. Appellant need not be present when the trial court corrects these errors. See Lee v. State, 826 So. 2d 457, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
ERVIN, PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2005)…(Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Washington v. State, 890 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); King v. State, 891 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Card v. State, 889 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Walker v. State, 886 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Long v. State, 886 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Stewart v. State, 884 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Wilson v. State, 884 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Ellis v. State, 881 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); B.L.J. v. State, 880 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Taylor v. State, 8…
-
Kalvin Youman v. State, 112 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…the court failed to rule on this motion within sixty days in 1D12-2470 and 1D12-2472, however, the motion is deemed denied as to these two cases. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B); Gallegos v. State, 63 So. 3d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Long v. State, 886 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Anders counsel argues that, because the trial court imposed the $100 cost without informing Youman of his right to contest the amount of the lien, this cost must be stricken from the judgments in 1D12-2470 and 1D12-2472, a…
-
Derrell J. Chamblee v. State, 93 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…te, 76 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Parker v. State, 44 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Because the trial court did not rule on this motion within sixty days of the filing date, it is deemed denied. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B); Long v. State, 886 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). We have de novo review of the pure issue of law concerning the statutory requirements for imposing these amounts. T.L.S. v. State, 949 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). By definition and nature, RICO encompasses an ongoing e…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dantler v. State, 584 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Williams v. State, 604 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Fryson v. State, 559 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- LEE v. State, 826 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Karlier Robinson v. State, 850 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- Lott v. State, 826 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Byrden v. State, 622 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Stanton Larry Hamer v. State, 682 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Smith v. State, 682 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)