JOHNNIE LAFLIPE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Johnnie Laflipe was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. On appeal, he challenged the admissibility of an excited utterance, gang-related evidence, and the denial of post-verdict juror interviews, but the Florida appellate court affirmed his conviction, finding no merit to any of his three points on appeal.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the three rulings. The excited utterance was properly admitted because Toussaint was still in an excited state, bleeding and moaning in pain, when he identified his shooter to his sister within minutes of arriving home. Gang-related evidence was relevant to prove motive, and any error was harmless. The trial court properly denied the juror interview request because the allegations concerned matters inherent to jury deliberations, which are not subject to juror interviews.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting a statement as an excited utterance when the declarant is in an excited state, suffering from pain, and identifie…
[2] Evidence of gang affiliation is admissible to prove motive when the prosecution's theory is that the defendant committed the crime to avenge an act against another gang m…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although there was no definitive time regarding when Toussaint was shot and when he arrived at his home, he was still in an excited state after being shot where blood was coming out of his wound, he was moaning in pain, and he told his sister, Immacula, within minutes of coming home, the identity of his shooter.”
Establishes that the excited utterance exception was properly applied despite timing uncertainty, based on Toussaint's physical and emotional state at the time of the statement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePhanuel Toussaint was shot and arrived home bleeding and in pain, telling his sister Immacula Toussaint within minutes that Laflipe was the shooter. T…
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RAMIREZ, J.
Johnnie Laflipe appeals from the trial court’s final judgment of conviction and sentence, finding him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder. We affirm because none of Laflipe’s three points on appeal have any merit.
First, we reject Laflipe’s contention that the trial court erred in allowing Im-macula Toussaint’s testimony under an invalid excited utterance theory, in violation of Laflipe’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
We review this ruling under the abuse of discretion standard. Damren v. State, 696 So. 2d 709 (Fla.1997).
The trial court allowed the statement by Phan-uel Toussaint to his sister identifying Laf-lipe as the man who shot him. Although theré was no definitive time regarding when Toussaint was shot and when he arrived at his home, he was still in an excited state after being shot where blood was coming out of his wound, he was moaning in pain, and he told his sister, Immacula, within minutes of coming home, the identity of his shooter. See Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710 (Fla.1996); Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla.1996).
We find no abuse of discretion.
Laflipe next claims that the trial court erred in allowing irrelevant and excessively prejudicial testimony and arguments concerning his association with the “Zombie Boys” street gang.
However, the record reflects that the trial court properly limited any testimony concerning the Zombie Boys gang, and Laflipe was not prejudiced by the admission of such testimony. The State never referred to the Zombie Boys as a gang. In addition, it was through Laflipe’s own questioning of Im-macula Toussaint on cross-examination that the jury heard that the Zombie Boys was a gang, when the defense asked her, ‘Your brother was not a member of the gang?” Furthermore, the trial court did not err in allowing testimony that Laflipe belonged to a group known as the Zombie Boys where it was relevant to show his motive for shooting Toussaint. See Reyes v. State, 783 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (gang evidence held relevant and admissible to prove motive at trial).
Here, Laflipe’s relationship with the Zombie Boys was relevant to prove motive because the State’s theory was that Laflipe shot Toussaint to avenge the shooting of another member of the Zombie Boys. Even if the reference to the Zombie Boys was error, it was harmless, based on the evidence introduced at trial. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
Finally, with respect to Laflipe’s claim that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying his request to interview a trial juror following the verdict where Laf-lipe had reason to believe that the verdict might be subject to legal challenge based on juror misconduct, we disagree. The record reflects that the juror’s allegations related to matters that she was influenced by the foreman, or that a fellow juror was influenced by another juror. Juror interviews are not permitted regarding any matter that inheres to the verdict and relates to jury deliberations. Devoney v. State, 717 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1998). Thus, the trial court properly denied Laflipe’s request to interview the juror in question where the allegations concerned matters which inhered in the verdict.
In conclusion, we affirm Laflipe’s conviction and sentence, because the three points raised on appeal have no merit.
Affirmed.
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Millan v. State, 932 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…iscretion. “[I]n some contexts, evidence of gang membership may be admissible to explain such disputed or unclear issues in the case as premeditation, motive or intent.” Reyes v. State, 783 So. 2d 1129, 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); see Laflipe v. State, 888 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Carving a gang insignia on the forehead of the dead or dying victim is inconsistent with the idea that the defendant killed the victim in self-defense. The expert testimony was that the exact symbol used, the Latin Kings’ initia…
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Strong v. State, 947 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…e contends Mrs. Strong was left lying helpless on the floor of her home, there still remains almost a four hour gap between the time Fire Rescue arrived at her home and the time Mrs. Strong made her statement to Officer Valdes. Cf. Laflipe v. State, 888 So. 2d 104, 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(uphold-ing the admission of a statement as an excited utterance because “[a]lthough there was no definitive time regarding when [the victim] was shot and when he arrived at his home, he was still in an excited state after bei…
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LaFlippe v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1996)
- Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1996)
- Devoney v. State, 717 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1998)
- Damren v. State, 696 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1997)
- Reyes v. State, 783 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)