ALEX MICHAEL GLUHAREFF, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida's aircraft-while-intoxicated statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor preempted by federal law, and the conviction is affirmed.
Section 860.13, Florida Statutes, prohibiting operation of an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol is neither unconstitutionally vague nor preempted by federal law.
[1] Federal Aviation Administration regulations do not preempt state law prohibiting operation of aircraft while under the influence of alcohol.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, a private pilot, pled guilty to operating an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 860.13, Florida Statutes…
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TORPY, J.
Appellant, a private pilot, pled guilty to operating an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 860.13, Florida Statutes (2001), expressly reserving two dispositive legal questions for review: First, whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague for failure to define “under the influence,” and second, whether the statute is void under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because it was preempted by federal law. We answer both questions in the negative and affirm.
As to the vagueness issue, we think the statute is sufficiently specific to give notice and adequate warning to persons of common intelligence of the conduct that is proscribed. See State v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260, 262 (1924) (city ordinance prohibiting vehicle operation while under the influence of alcohol not unconstitutionally vague).
Insofar as Appellant’s preemption argument is concerned, we agree with the discussion of this issue contained in Hughes v. Attorney General of Florida, 377 F. 3d 1258, 1265-69, (11th Cir.2004), and conclude that Federal Aviation Administration regulations do not manifest an intent to preempt state regulation of alcohol misuse by pilots either expressly or through “field preemption.”
AFFIRMED.
PLEUS, J, and WALSH, J.D. Associate Judge, concur.
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Hughes v. State, 943 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ct matter.”). While we conclude that the preemption issue is barred by res judicata, had the issue not been barred, we would have found, as did our sister court to the north, that the defendants’ prosecutions were not preempted. Gluhareff v. State, 888 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (determining that section 860.13 is not preempted by federal law). Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the federal government has the power to preempt state criminal laws, and if state law conflicts with…
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Cloyd v. State, 943 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ct matter.”). While we conclude that the preemption issue is barred by res judicata, had the issue not been barred, we would have found, as did our sister court to the north, that the defendants’ prosecutions were not preempted. Gluhareff v. State, 888 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)(deter- [*159] mining that section 860.13 is not preempted by federal law). Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the federal government has the power to preempt state criminal laws, and if state law confli…
Authorities Cited
- Hughes v. Attorney General OF Florida, 377 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2004)
- The State of Fla. ex rel. Harlis Sellers v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181 (Fla. 1924)