STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BRANDI DEMILLE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appealed Brandi DeMille's sentences in three cases, challenging the trial court's failure to impose mandatory minimum imprisonment and fines for drug trafficking conspiracy, and improper imposition of drug offender probation for a driving-while-license-suspended offense. The appellate court reversed and remanded on two issues while affirming one claim.
The trial court erred in both instances. For the hydrocodone conspiracy conviction, the court was statutorily required to impose a three-year mandatory minimum sentence and a $50,000 fine, and the case was reversed and remanded for resentencing with opportunity to withdraw the plea. For the driving-while-license-suspended offense, drug offender probation was improper because driving while license suspended is not an enumerated offense subject to such probation.
[1] A trial court is statutorily required to impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a specified fine for the offense of conspiracy to traffic in hydrocodone.
[2] When a sentence is reversed due to a trial court's failure to impose a mandatory minimum sentence, the defendant should be given the opportunity to withdraw their plea on…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court was statutorily required to impose a three-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for this offense”
Establishes the mandatory sentencing requirement for hydrocodone trafficking conspiracy that the trial court violated
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeMille pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in hydrocodone in case 03-16579 and was sentenced to ten years' drug offender probation instead of the…
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CANADY, Judge.
The State appeals Brandi DeMille’s sentences imposed in three different, cases. We affirm on one of the State’s claims without discussion, but we reverse and remand on the remaining two.
DeMille pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in hydrocodone in circuit court case number 03-16579, and the trial court sentenced her to ten years’ drug offender probation. The State argues, and DeMille concedes, that the trial court was statutorily required to impose a three-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for this offense. See § 893.135(l)(c)(l)(a), (5), Fla. Stat. (2003). We agree and reverse and remand for resentencing in compliance with the requirements of section 893.135(l)(c)(l)(a). See State v. Couch, 600 So. 2d 55, 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (holding that it is error not to impose the appropriate mandatory minimum sentence); State v. Delgado, 717 So. 2d 1053, 1053-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that it is well settled that statutorily mandated fines must be imposed absent a stipulation by the State); Lopez v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298, 1299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that the trial court must follow the statute and impose the mandatory fine). Because DeMille’s sentence was a result of a plea agreement between her and .the trial court, she should be given the opportunity to withdraw her plea on remand. See State v. Honiker, 675 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
The State also contends that the trial court erred in sentencing DeMille to drug offender probation on the count of driving while license suspended in circuit court case number 01-08638. We agree. Driving while license suspended is not an enumerated offense subject to drug offender probation. See § 948.034(1), Fla. Stat. (2000); Buswell v. State, 855 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Lazo, 761 So. 2d 1244, 1244-45 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Therefore, we reverse DeMille’s sentence of drug offender probation in case number 01-08638 and remand-for resentencing. We note that on remand the trial court may resentence DeMille to regular probation for this offense based on the valid departure reason cited in the sentencing guidelines scoresheet.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
NORTHCUTT and SILBERMAN, JJ., concur.
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Redmond v. State, 970 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…offender probation for delivery of cocaine. State v. Roper, 915 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); see also Anderson v. State, 941 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). On remand, the trial court may resentence Redmond to regular probation. State v. DeMille, 890 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The trial court may also impose such special conditions as it deems appropriate; provided that they are reasonably related to the offense and promote the rehabilitation of the defendant or the protection of the public. See Grubbs…
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Plummer v. State, 121 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…ears and a fine of $100,000.00. § 893.135(l)(c)l.b, Fla. Stat. (2010). Nothing in the statute gave the trial court the discretion to impose a lower minimum mandatory and fine. See State v. Cuesta, 490 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); State v. DeMille, 890 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); State v. Delgado, 717 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Appellant conceded the trial court’s error on this point. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED. PADOVANO, MARSTILLER, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.…
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State v. Kena R. Mease, 200 So. 3d 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…93.135, our court, as well as every one of our sister courts, has concluded that the trial court lacks discretion to sentence a defendant below the mandatory minimum. See Plummer v. State, 121 So. 3d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); State v. DeMille, 890 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); State v. Delgado, 717 So. 2d 1053, 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Lopez v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298, 1299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); State v. Row, 478 So. 2d 430, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). As our court has explained, “mandatory minimum sen…
Authorities Cited
- Tucker v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Cleveland Campbell and Eleanor Campbell v. Escambia Cnty., 675 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- State v. Lazo, 761 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- State v. Delgado, 717 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Green v. State, 855 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Buswell v. State, 855 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- State v. Couch, 600 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- State v. FOX, 600 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)