CEBERT H. SNELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court should have considered the defendant's claim under rule 3.850, not rule 3.800(a), because the claim was facially sufficient.
The defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that a probation condition imposed by his probation officer was not in the origin…
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PER CURIAM.
Cebert Snell appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm in part the order of the trial court, but we reverse and remand for reconsideration of one of Snell’s claims.
In his motion, Snell argued that he admitted violating a condition of his probation that was imposed by his probation officer but was not included in the order of probation entered by the trial court. He claimed that the enhancement of his probation violated his right against double jeopardy. The trial court considered the claim as one filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a) and denied the claim because Snell did not demonstrate that his entitlement to relief is apparent from the court records.
We disagree and conclude that Snell has stated a facially sufficient claim for relief, and the trial court should have considered his claim as one filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Casterline v. State, 703 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The record before this court does not refute Snell’s claim. Therefore, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with rule 3.850.
Reversed and remanded.
ALTENBERND, C.J., and FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.
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Bronk v. State, 25 So. 3d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…peal, we became concerned that Mr. Bronk had alleged a valid claim even though he had cited no case law that was directly on point. Accordingly, we asked the State to respond. The State responded and disclosed this court’s decision in Lee v. State, 890 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), which squarely supports Mr. Bronk’s claim. The State also recognized that the doctrine of law of the case did not prevent an award of additional jail credit at this time. This court acknowledges and appreciates the professionalis…
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Riviere v. State, 965 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…rtheless, because Riviere’s motion was properly sworn and otherwise met the requirements of rule 3.850, the postconviction court should not have denied it but rather should have treated it as a motion filed pursuant to that rule. See Snell v. State, 890 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court’s order and remand for reconsideration pursuant to rule 3.850. If the court again denies the motion, it shall attach portions…
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Richie v. State, 959 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (remanding the denial of a motion to correct sentence to the postconviction court to reconsider as if filed under rule 3.850 because the motion was sworn and timely under'the rule); see also Snell v. State, 890 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Richie’s claim and remand. On remand, the postconviction court shall attach portions of the record that conclusively refute Richie’s claim or, if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing. ■…
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- Casterline v. State, 703 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)