DAVID PARESKY, APPELLANT,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, ET AL., APPELLEES
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David Paresky appealed a trial court's dismissal of his two-count declaratory judgment action challenging a Miami-Dade County parking variance ordinance and resolution. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Count 1 was time-barred under the statute of limitations and Count 2 was barred by collateral estoppel because the identical issues had been previously litigated through quasi-judicial and appellate proceedings.
The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on two independent grounds: (1) Count 1 was time-barred because the statute of limitations began running in 1989 when the Resolution was enacted or when development commenced under it; and (2) Count 2 was barred by collateral estoppel because Paresky had received a full and fair adjudication of the identical claims through quasi-judicial proceedings and appellate review.
[1] A declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a county ordinance and variances approved thereunder is barred by the statute of limitations if brought…
[2] The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties and the matter was fully litigated and determined in a co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the claim is time-barred as the appellant's statute of limitations period began to run in 1989, when the Resolution was first enacted, or, at the latest, when development commenced under the 1989 Resolution”
Establishes the court's holding on the statute of limitations defense for Count 1
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParesky filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding Section 33-311(A)(4)(b) of the Miami-Dade County Code and parking non-use variances app…
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PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff below, David S. Paresky, appeals from the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for partial summary judgment. We affirm.
In the underlying action, Paresky filed a two-count complaint seeking declaratory relief. In Count 1, Paresky sought a declaration that Section 33 — 311 (A)(4)(b) of the Code of Miami-Dade County was unconstitutional and that the parking non-use variances approved pursuant to the ordinance were unconstitutional. In Count 2, Pare-sky sought a declaration that the omissions of the variances in the 1989 Resolution were not “scrivener errors” and that the 1989 Resolution could not be changed without the approval of the Miami-Dade County Commission.
The trial court dismissed Count 1:-find-ing that it was barred by the statute of limitations because the resolution at issue in this case was adopted on March 9, 1989, and this declaratory action was brought beyond the four-year, statute of limitations. The trial court further found that plaintiff was estopped from alleging, as 'he did in Count 2, that the errors in 1989 Resolution were not scrivener errors based on the fact that he received a quasi-judiciál hearing from the Miami-Dade County Commission on April 26, 2001, and subsequent appellate review from the circuit court and this court. ’ The plaintiffs appeal follows.
With respect to Count 1, this court finds that the claim is time-barred as the appellant’s statute of limitations period began to run in 1989, when the Resolution was first enacted, or, at the latest, when development commenced under the 1989 Resolution. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the appellant’s declaratory judgment action was time-barred. Hollywood Lakes Section Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. City of. Hollywood, 676 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
With respect to Count 2, this court finds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. Under Florida law, collateral estoppel applies when the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties and the particular matter was-fully litigated and determined in a contest that results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. Gentile v. Bander, 718 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla.1998); Deft of Health & Rehab. Sens. v. B.J.M.,. 656 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995).
There is no dispute that the prior litigation and instant case involve the same parties and the identical issue. The parties disagree on whether or not the appellant was afforded a full and fair adjudication of his claim by a court of competent jurisdiction. We believe he was as the appellant received a quasi-judicial hearing before the Miami-Dade County Commission and appellate review by the circuit and district courts. The appellant’s certiorari review in the circuit court required consideration of whether the agency decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence. Fla. Power & Light v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.2000). Although the appellant’s claims were rejected by the circuit and district courts without a written opinion, the fact remains that the identical claims raised herein were previously litigated. Accordingly, the appellant is barred from re-litigating them through a declaratory judgment action.
Affirmed.
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Atl. Shores Resort, LLC v. 507 S. St. Corp. & City of Key W., 937 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…nd no merit to this argument as quasi-judicial entities, as is the special master in the instant case, are considered “courts of competent jurisdiction” for the purposes of collateral estoppel. See Paresky v. Miami-Dade County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 893 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); City of Tampa v. Lewis, 488 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); U.S. Fid. Guar. Co. v. Odoms, 444 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). As all of the elements of collateral estop-pel were met and the issue of whether the [*124…
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Milan Inv. Grp., Inc. v. City OF Miami, 50 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…ural stage was whether Milan Investment’s challenge — intended for eventual certification as a class action— [*663] was barred by the four-year statute of limitations1 and this Court’s decision in Paresky v. Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners, 893 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). We affirm the trial court’s dismissal ruling insofar as Milan Investment sought a declaratory judgment that the establishment of DDA and its boundaries was unconstitutional. However, because the City of Miami’s authorization of m…
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Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City OF Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2000)
- Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1995)
- Hollywood Lakes Section Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. City OF Hollywood, 676 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Gentile v. Bauder, 718 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1998)