EIGHT HUNDRED, INC., ET AL., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eight Hundred, Inc. and other appellants, acquitted of all criminal charges, appealed the trial court's denial of their motion for return of seized personal property. The court held that while most of the property descriptions were insufficiently identified, a few items were described with adequate particularity and warranted remand for a determination on return.
The trial court's dismissal was affirmed in all respects except for certain items that were identified with sufficient particularity: a bingo lottery drum and invoices/correspondence from Orange County; DR-15 sales tax documents from Lee County; and items listed in a search warrant inventory and receipt from Osceola County dated March 30, 1994. The case was remanded as to these identified items for determination of whether they should be returned.
[1] A court has inherent power to order the return of property seized from a criminal defendant if the property is no longer needed as evidence.
[2] A motion for the return of seized property must allege that the property belonged to the movant, was not the fruit of criminal activity, and was not being held as evidenc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A court has inherent power to direct the return of property seized from a criminal defendant if that property is no longer needed as evidence.”
Establishes the foundational legal principle permitting courts to order return of seized property in criminal cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEight Hundred's predecessor operated bingo halls in several counties and was subject to a multi-county criminal investigation resulting in seizure of …
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MONACO, J.
This case in a number of different iterations has been a frequent visitor to this court.1 Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc., n/k/a Eight Hundred, Inc. (“Eight Hundred”), and the other appellants in this appeal have been acquitted of all criminal charges against them, and seek the return of personal property seized by the State in connection with those charges. We are now faced with the issue of whether the motion for return of personal property filed by Eight Hundred sufficiently identified the seized property.
Eight Hundred’s predecessor was a business that operated bingo halls in several counties. As a result of a multi-county criminal investigation, state and local authorities seized Eight Hundred’s personal property, and sought to enjoin it from operating bingo games at various locations. Numerous criminal charges, as well as forfeiture and RICO actions, were brought against Eight Hundred’s predecessor, none of which appeal' to be currently pending. After giving Eight Hundred many opportunities to describe the items of property with greater specificity, the trial court denied the motion seeking return of the property with prejudice as “legally insufficient,” finding that the property had never been adequately identified by the movant. Eight Hundred appeals the order of dismissal.2 For the most part we agree with the trial judge and commend him for his patience. Nevertheless, Eight Hundred does appear to have identified a few items with sufficient definition, and as to those items, we reverse.
A court has inherent power to direct the return of property seized from a criminal defendant if that property is no longer needed as evidence. See Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). To be facially sufficient, a motion for the return of seized property must allege that the property at issue was the movant’s personal property, was not the fruit of criminal activity, and was not being held as evidence. Implied in this standard is the requirement that the defendant must specifically identify the property at issue. See Bolden v. State, 875 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In Coon, the court noted that the appellant’s description of the property allegedly taken was “somewhat vague” as it merely set forth “tools, radios, speakers, etc.” The court indicated, however, that since the alleged dates of the seizures were listed and a return search warrant inventory was included, the information provided was sufficient to satisfy any uncertainty regarding a proper description of the property sought. To some extent, we have the same circumstance here. From our review of the record it appears that the following items were identified with enough particularity to permit the trial court to determine whether they should be returned to Eight Hundred:
A. Property seized in Orange County:
1. Bingo lottery drum.
2. Invoices and correspondence actually in possession of the Attorney General’s Office.
B. Property seized in Lee County: DR-15 (sales tax documents), to the extent that the same are in the possession of the State and have not been destroyed.
C. Property seized in Osceola County: Items listed in the search warrant inventory and receipt dated March 30, 1994.
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal in all respects, except as to the items listed above. We remand the case to the trial court for a determination regarding whether these items ought to be returned to Eight Hundred.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
PLEUS and TORPY, JJ„ concur. . Various interrelated cases have been reviewed by this court over the years. See Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc. v. Lamar, 866 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 879 So. 2d 623 (Fla.2004); Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc. v. Lamar, 860 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc. v. Croft, 844 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc. v. City of St. Cloud, 837 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Eight Hundred, Inc. v. State, 781 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). See also, Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Bradenton Group, Inc., 727 So. 2d 199 (Fla.1998).
. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(l)(C)(ii).
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Almeda v. State, 959 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…is not the fruit of criminal activity, and that the property is not being held as evidence. Scott v. State, 922 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Bolden v. State, 875 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Eight Hundred, Inc. v. State, 895 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). The circuit court might have concluded that Mr. Almeda’s motion was fa- [*809] dally insufficient because the motion did not include an allegation that the property was not the fruit of criminal activity. See Bolden, 875…
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Scott v. State, 922 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…er property held in custodia legis. Eight Hundred I, 781 So. 2d at 1191. This authority extends to property seized from the defendant and vests in the court the power to assist the owner in the recovery of his property. Eight Hundred, Inc. v. State, 895 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (Eight Hundred II); Eight Hundred I, 781 So. 2d at 1191. This authority continues beyond the close of the criminal prosecution. Eight Hundred I, 781 So. 2d at 1191. Once Scott filed a motion for return of property, the tria…
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Dougan v. Ric L. Bradshaw, 198 So. 3d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…to be entitled to a return of seized property, a movant must allege and prove that “the property at issue was the movant’s personal property, was not the fruit of criminal activity, and was not being held as evidence.” Eight Hundred, Inc. v. State, 895 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Conversely, as discussed above, in order to allege a cause of action under section 790.33, the complaining party must allege and prove that it was “adversely affected by any ordinance, regulation, measure, directive, rule,…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Deatrick S. Bolden v. State, 875 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Eight Hundred, Inc. v. State, 781 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Dep't OF Legal Affairs v. Bradenton Grp., Inc., 727 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1998)
- Pondella Hall FOR Hire, Inc. v. Lawson Lamar, 866 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Pondella Hall FOR Hire, Inc. v. C.W. (Charlie) Croft, 844 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Pondella Hall FOR Hire, Inc. v. City OF ST. Cloud, 837 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Knapp v. State, 860 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)