DAVID MARKIN, APPELLANT,
v.
SUSAN MARKIN, APPELLEE
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In this Florida family law appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's award of post-judgment alimony to Susan Markin pending appeal to secure payment of her lump sum equitable distribution award, but remanded to credit David Markin's alimony payments against the outstanding lump sum obligation.
The court affirmed that the trial court properly awarded post-judgment alimony to protect Susan Markin's welfare pending appeal of the unpaid lump sum award, but remanded to credit the full value of David Markin's post-judgment alimony payments against the outstanding lump sum cash payment.
[1] Post-judgment alimony awarded to secure payment of a lump sum equitable distribution may be credited against the outstanding amount of that lump sum payment.
[2] Trial courts have jurisdiction to enter post-judgment awards necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending appeal.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The purpose of lump sum alimony is to discharge the husband from any further obligation to the wife after the date final judgment is entered; thus, payments made after this date, but pursuant to an order requiring temporary alimony pending appeal, goes toward discharge of that obligation.”
Establishes the legal principle that post-judgment alimony payments pending appeal should be credited against the lump sum obligation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court ordered David Markin to pay Susan Markin post-judgment alimony of $10,000 per week to secure payment of a cash lump sum as part of the…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm on appeal and cross-appeal in all respects, except that we remand the case to the trial court so that David Mar-kin’s post-judgment alimony payments of $10,000 per week, as ordered by the trial court to secure his payment of the cash lump sum necessary to effect an equitable distribution, can be credited against the outstanding amount of the lump sum cash payment.
This conclusion is based on McPherson v. McPherson, 775 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), in which the final judgment of dissolution awarded the former wife, in part, a cash payment of $93,201. Id. at 973. The former wife requested alimony pending appeal to meet her financial needs because the cash payment was the only liquid asset she would receive and its payment was stayed. Id. The trial court denied the former wife’s request for alimony. Id. This Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider the request under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c)(1) which grants the trial court jurisdiction to enter post-judgment awards “necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending appeal.” Id. at 973-974. This is especially the case where an award of post-judgment alimony is “inextricably intertwined” with a not yet paid cash equitable distribution award. Id. at 974.
In the case at bar, the trial court was well within its discretion to award Susan Markin post-judgment alimony until such time as David Markin paid her the lump sum cash portion of the equitable distribution award. However, based on Frischkorn v. Frischkorn, 223 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), we remand to the trial court for the full value of David Markin’s post-judgment alimony payments to be credited against the outstanding amount of the lump sum cash payment. In Frischkom, the court wrote:
The purpose of lump sum alimony is to discharge the husband from any further obligation to the wife after the date final judgment is entered; thus, payments made after this date, but pursuant to an order requiring temporary alimony pending appeal, goes toward discharge of that obligation.
Id. at 382. The trial court stated in the final judgment in the case at bar that “[ajlthough the payment is pursuant to equitable distribution, the court finds that the equalizing payment is in the nature of support because the funds so transferred are intended to enable the wife to be self-supporting,” so that a credit is appropriate under the rationale of Frischkom.
AFFIRMED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GUNTHER, STONE and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
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Reidy v. Liudmyla Y. Reidy, 232 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…emand to the circuit court for further proceedings. If the court determines that post-judgment alimony was appropriate, the court should consider whether the Former Husband is entitled to a credit on the equitable distribution. See Markin v. Markin, 896 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We affirm the award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs without further comment. [*1056] Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. May and Klingensmith, JJ., concur. . This court affirmed the August, 2016 final judgm…
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Markin v. Markin, 953 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…review of a trial court order1 under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(c). This order awarded David Markin, the former husband, costs totaling $171,6492 for the appeal of the final judgment of dissolution in this case, see Markin v. Markin, 896 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Susan Markin contends that the trial court erred by awarding David Markin appellate costs, because he was not the prevailing party on appeal. David Markin did not respond to Susan Markin’s motion within the time permitted by the…
Authorities Cited
- Frischkorn v. Thomasine G. Frischkorn, 223 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- MacKey v. State, 223 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- McPHERSON v. McPHERSON, 775 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)