LAWRENCE TIMOTHY REID, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lawrence Timothy Reid was convicted of cocaine possession following a no-contest plea. Reid appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine, arguing the initial traffic stop was unlawful. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the officer lawfully stopped Reid's vehicle for obstructing traffic and properly seized the cocaine discovered in plain view during a lawful pat-down.
The court held that the officer lawfully stopped Reid's vehicle because the deputy had probable cause to believe Reid had committed the traffic infraction of obstructing traffic. Once lawfully stopped, the officer was authorized to order Reid out of the vehicle, and the cocaine discovered in plain view was properly seized.
[1] A traffic stop is lawful under the Fourth Amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred.
[2] Parking a vehicle in a roadway near an intersection in a manner that causes another vehicle to drive around it can constitute probable cause for a traffic stop for obstru…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred”
Establishes the standard for the validity of traffic stops under federal constitutional law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReid parked his vehicle in the roadway near an intersection, causing another vehicle to drive around it. A deputy stopped Reid's vehicle for violating…
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TAYLOR, J.
Appellant Lawrence Timothy Reid was convicted of possession of cocaine following his no contest plea. He appeals, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine. We affirm, because the police officer lawfully seized the cocaine after discovering it in plain view when appellant was ordered out of his vehicle during the course of a lawful traffic stop for obstructing traffic.1
The trial court properly determined that appellant’s conduct in parking his vehicle in the roadway near an intersection and causing another vehicle to drive around appellant’s vehicle provided probable cause for the traffic stop.
The facts in this case show an intent to impede or hinder the free flow of traffic, thus distinguishing this case from Underwood v. State, 801 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendant’s vehicle).
Here, because the deputy had probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had occurred, his stop of appellant’s car was permissible. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred); Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997) (holding that Florida courts are required to follow Whren’s objective test and determine only whether probable cause existed for the traffic stop in question).
Contrary to appellant’s argument, the officer did not need a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for an investigatory stop, because the initial traffic stop was valid and appellant was not detained beyond the time necessary to issue a citation. See Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla.1990) (citing State v. Anderson, 479 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)); K.G.M. v. State, 816 So. 2d 748, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
Further, once appellant was lawfully stopped for the traffic violation, the officer was authorized to order him out of his vehicle. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (holding that for general safety purposes an officer may routinely order the driver of a lawfully stopped vehicle to exit the vehicle because when the vehicle is already stopped, the slight additional intrusion associated with being directed to exit the car can only be described as de minimis); Faulkner v. State, 834 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (same quoting Mimms); Mendez v. State, 678 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that the officer acted within the scope of his authority in requiring the defendant, stopped in middle lane of traffic, to exit his vehicle); State v. Bernard, 650 So. 2d 100, 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped, an officer may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment)..
AFFIRMED.
FARMER, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J., concur. . The officer stopped appellant for willfully blocking traffic in violation of Florida Statutes section 316.2045, which states in pertinent part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person or persons willfully to obstruct the free, convenient, and normal use of any public street, highway, or road by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding, or restraining traffic or passage thereon, by standing or approaching motor vehicles thereon, or by endangering the safe movement of vehicles or pedestrians traveling thereon; and any person or persons who violate the provisions of this subsection, upon conviction, shall be cited for a pedestrian violation, punishable as provided in chapter 318.
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C.W. v. State, 76 So. 3d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…tional traffic, which appeared after C.W. was forcibly removed from the roadway, would have been equally impeded by C.W.’s refusal to move. The majority relies on Underwood, which has no application in this case, and fails to mention Reid v. State, 898 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a case in which the Fourth District distinguished its holding in Underwood, and which is applicable to the facts in the instant case. In Reid, the Fourth District stated the following: [*1099] Reid, 898 So. 2d at 249. Thus, as t…
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State v. Arevalo, 112 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…was permitted to issue a ticket “to the driver” under section 316.1945(3), Florida Statutes (2011). Further, at the time of the stop, appellee did not need to be engaged in “criminal activity,” as stated by the trial court. See, e.g., Reid v. State, 898 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“the officer did not need a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for an investigatory stop, because the initial traffic stop was valid and appellant was not detained beyond the time necessary to issue a citation”). Nor…
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Andrews v. State, 962 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…r pants pocket after she was ordered out of the vehicle. The officers’ presence at the location where the observation was made was justified; therefore, retrieval of the contraband pipe provided probable cause to arrest Appellant. See Reid v. State, 898 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Derrickson v. State, 399 So. 2d 100, 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). When the trial court denied the disposi-tive motion to suppress, Appellant reserved her right to appeal the denial of the motion. She then entered a no-contest plea…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1977)
- Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1997)
- Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990)
- Racino v. State, 479 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Faulkner v. State, 834 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Underwood v. State, 801 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Mendez v. State, 678 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Lopez v. State, 801 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- K.G.M. v. State, 816 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)