DAVID W. NOTTEBAUM, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Nottebaum seeks a belated appeal claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, arguing that his conviction for trafficking in oxycodone was improper because the evidence showed only a Schedule III substance, not a Schedule II substance subject to trafficking charges. The court denies the petition, holding that the legislature's 2001 amendment to sections 893.03(3) and 893.135 superseded the Hayes decision and applied to Nottebaum's September 2001 crimes.
Appellate counsel was not ineffective because Hayes does not apply to Nottebaum's case. The legislature's July 1, 2001 amendment to sections 893.03(3) and 893.135 superseded Hayes by providing that the weight of a controlled substance is the total weight of the mixture, including the controlled substance and any other substance in the mixture. Because Nottebaum committed his crimes after the amendment took effect, his conviction was proper.
[1] A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel requires a showing that the appellate counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the de…
[2] A defendant cannot be convicted of trafficking a Schedule II substance if the evidence does not establish that the substance meets the statutory definition for Schedule I…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the legislature amended sections 893.03(3) and 893.135. The legislature said that Hayes did not correctly construe legislative intent and it added a definition to provide that the weight of a controlled substance is the total weight of the mixture, including the controlled substance and any other substance in the mixture”
Establishes that the 2001 legislative amendment explicitly rejected the Hayes holding and redefined controlled substance weight
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNottebaum was convicted in April 2003 of trafficking in illegal drugs (28 grams or more but less than 30 kilograms) and sale of oxycodone (a controlle…
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[*1074] GRIFFIN, J.
Petitioner, David W. Nottebaum, seeks a belated appeal, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner was tried and convicted in April 2003 of trafficking in illegal drugs, twenty-eight grams or more but less than thirty kilograms, and sale of a controlled substance (oxycodone). He was sentenced to a, twenty-five year minimum mandatory term for trafficking and a concurrent term of 105.9 months for the sale.
In the direct appeal, petitioner’s appellate counsel argued that the. trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal where the FDLE lab technician who actually performed the lab analysis of the drugs and prepared the lab report did not testify at trial. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were per curiam affirmed. See Nottebaum v. State, 881 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
Petitioner now argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that a fundamental error was committed when petitioner was convicted of trafficking in a Schedule I or Schedule II substance, when the evidence at trial conclusively showed that he sold a Schedule III substance. Petitioner relies on Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1999). Petitioner acknowledges that this issue was not raised or argued at trial, but contends that the due process clause forbids convicting a person of a crime without proving all the elements and argues that such a denial constitutes fundamental error.'
In Hayes, the Florida supreme court held that only if a dosage unit or tablet contains more than fifteen milligrams of hydrocodone can the hydrocodone be considered a Schedule II drug which can be the subject of a trafficking charge. Petitioner claims that according to his independent investigation, based on a telephone call to a pharmacist, the pills in his case only contained ten milligrams of hy-drocodone. He reasons that he could not be convicted of trafficking in a Schedule II drug, even though he possessed forty of the pills.
Hayes does not.apply to his case. Effective July 1, 2001, the legislature amended sections 893.03(3) and 893.135. The legislature said that Hayes did not correctly construe legislative intent and it added a definition to provide that the weight of a controlled substance is the total weight of the mixture, including the controlled substance and any other substance in the mixture. See Ch.2001-55, § 1. Petitioner committed his crimes on September 27, 2001, after the amendment took effect. Therefore, petitioner’s appellate counsel was not ineffective. See generally Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495, 509-10 (Fla.2003); Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 607 (Fla.2003); Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1128 (Fla.2003).
PETITION DENIED.
SAWAYA, C.J., and PETERSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Boyette, 911 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…king statute did not apply to possession of hydrocodone in amounts less than 15 milligrams per dosage unit. However, this decision was legislatively overruled as of July 1, 2001. See Laws of Florida, Ch.2001-55, §§ 1, 2; see also Nottebaum v. State, 898 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The information in the case before us alleges that Appellee committed the offense on August 23, 2003. Under the applicable statutes, the weight of a controlled substance is measured by the total weight of the mixture, incl…
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Hollingshead v. State, 80 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…that, for purposes of a trafficking charge, the weight of the controlled substance per dosage unit is irrelevant and that "the weight of the controlled substance is calculated by aggregating the total weight of each mixture.” See Nottebaum v. State, 898 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).…
Authorities Cited
- Kathyrn Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999)
- Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2003)
- Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2003)
- Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2003)