WILLIAM REGINALD PARRISH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Parrish appealed his probation conditions following his plea to burglary with battery and criminal mischief. The court agreed that certain probation conditions—requiring him to pay for drug/alcohol testing and to undergo evaluation and treatment—were special conditions that should have been pronounced at sentencing and were therefore invalid.
The court held that while the testing requirement itself is a valid general condition under Florida Statutes § 948.03(l)(k), the requirement that Parrish pay for the tests is an invalid special condition that must be pronounced at sentencing. Additionally, the evaluation and treatment requirements are special conditions requiring pronouncement at sentencing and have no statutory or rule authority exempting them from this requirement.
[1] Special conditions of probation that are not pronounced at the sentencing hearing are invalid.
[2] A requirement to pay for drug or alcohol testing as a condition of probation is a special condition that must be pronounced at sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the testing requirement set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 12 is authorized by section 948.03(l)(k)l., Florida Statutes (2002) and is therefore a valid general condition which need not be pronounced at the time sentence is imposed”
Establishes that statutory drug testing requirements qualify as general conditions not requiring pronouncement at sentencing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParrish entered a plea to burglary with battery and criminal mischief and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment followed by five years probation. Th…
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PER CURIAM.
William Reginald Parrish entered a plea to burglary with battery and criminal mischief and, consistent with the plea agreement, was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment to be followed by five years of probation. After preserving the issues through an unsuccessful Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, Parrish argues on appeal that two conditions of probation are special conditions which were not pronounced at the sentencing hearing and are therefore invalid. We agree and reverse.
Paragraph 12 of the probation order in question provides:
You will submit to urinalysis, breathalyzer, or blood tests at any time requested by your officer, or the professional staff or any treatment center where you are receiving treatment, to determine possible use of alcohol, drugs, or controlled substances. You shall be required to pay for the tests unless payment is waived by your officer. If you test positive for illegal substance, you must undergo a (drug/alcohol) evaluation, and it [sic] treatment is deemed necessary, you must successfully complete the treatment/aftercare.
The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the testing requirement set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 12 is authorized by section 948.03(l)(k)l., Florida Statutes (2002) and is therefore a valid general condition which need not be pronounced at the time sentence is imposed. Brock v. State, 688 So. 2d 909 (Fla.1997). The state argues that the second sentence of paragraph 12, requiring Parrish to pay the costs of such testing, is authorized by section 948.09(6), Florida Statutes. We agree with appellant, however, that the issue was settled adversely to the state in State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1998). The fact that the condition set forth in paragraph 12 of the order also states that Parrish must pay for the tests “unless payment is waived by your officer” does not compel a different result.1' Finally, we find no statutory or rule authority that would make evaluation and treatment, and successful completion of the treatment, general conditions in this case which are exempt from the requirement that special conditions of probation must be pronounced at sentencing.
The cause is reversed and remanded for entry of an amended order of probation. The judgment and sentence are otherwise affirmed.
REVERSED.
ALLEN, DAVIS and BROWNING, JJ., concur. . This same caveat appears in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e) where the re-quiremenl that the defendant pay for the testing is listed as a special condition.
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Person v. State, 83 So. 3d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…tandard condition of probation, and none was clearly enunciated during the oral pronouncement of additional ones.2 See Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, [*942] 227 n. 3 (Fla.2007); Cole v. State, 932 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Parrish v. State, 898 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). 3. It was alleged that Person had violated condition L3 of the order of probation in that he failed to file job search logs. Because there was no orally pronounced or written order which required the filing of such documents, h…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Chuck Junior Williams, 712 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1998)
- Brock v. State, 688 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1997)