CITY OF AUBURNDALE, A FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION CREATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
TOWN OF POLK CITY, A FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION CREATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that Polk City lacked standing to challenge Auburndale's annexation because it was not an 'affected party' under the statute, and thus the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting certiorari.
[1] A municipality's annexation of its own property does not materially affect a neighboring municipality's statutory authorization to provide water and wastewater services t…
[2] To have standing to seek certiorari review of an annexation ordinance under Florida Statute § 171.081, a party must be 'affected' by and anticipate 'material injury' from…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuburndale purchased land for a power plant sprayfield and annexed it. Polk City, whose reserve area included the land, challenged the annexation, cla…
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CASANUEVA, Judge.
In response to the City of Auburndale’s approval of an annexation ordinance, the Town of Polk City petitioned the circuit court for certiorari review of administrative action.
The circuit court granted certiorari, quashed Auburndale’s approval of the ordinance, and invalidated the ordinance. On Auburndale’s second-tier petition for certiorari, this court is limited to determining whether there was a lack of procedural due process or a departure from the essential requirements of law. Martin County v. City of Stuart, 736 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citing Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla.1995)). Because Polk City lacked standing to bring the initial petition for certiorari, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law.
Therefore, we grant Auburndale’s petition for certiorari and quash the circuit court’s order. In 2001, the Florida Cabinet approved construction of a new power plant in Au-burndale. Reclaimed water will be used to cool the plant, and Auburndale contracted to be responsible for disposing of this water.
In August 2002, the City of Auburn-dale purchased 196 acres of undeveloped land so that discharged water from the plant could be routed to this sprayfield for disposal. Because the sprayfield is within the Town of Polk City’s Water and Waste-water Reserve Area, Polk City is authorized to provide water and wastewater services to the property.
In September 2003, Auburndale’s City Commission approved an ordinance annexing the sprayfield. Polk City then petitioned the circuit court for certiorari review, contending that the Commission had departed from the essential requirements of the law by approving the annexation of a noncontiguous parcel of land. Auburn-dale countered that the land was in fact contiguous, as it had previously annexed the intervening strip of land, and asserted that Polk City did not have standing to challenge the annexation.
The circuit court concluded that Polk City had standing because the annexation could affect Polk City’s right to provide water and wastewater services to the property.
The circuit court’s conclusion, however, was a departure from the essential requirements of law because Polk City has no contractual or statutory right to challenge Auburn-dale’s legitimate annexation powers.
Florida’s “Appeal on Annexation or Contraction” statute provides that “any party affected who believes that he or she will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the municipal governing body to comply with the procedures set forth in this chapter for annexation ... may file a petition ... seeking review by certiorari.” § 171.081, Fla. Stat. (2003).
Thus, for an entity to have standing to seek review by certiorari, it must be “affected” by and anticipate “material injury” from the annexation. Polk City does not pass this test. Polk City claims that it has an exclusive right to provide water and waste-water services to the annexed property and that the annexation will materially affect this right. Polk City points to statutory language as the source of this right.
Section 180.06, Florida Statutes (2003), titled “Activities Authorized by Municipalities and Private Companies,” instructs:
Any municipality or private company organized for the purposes contained in this chapter, is authorized:
(3) To provide water and alternative water supplies, including, but not limited to, reclaimed water, and water from aquifer storage and recovery and desalination systems for domestic, municipal or industrial uses; [and]
(4) To provide for the collection and disposal of sewage, including wastewater reuse, and other liquid wastes.
However, authorization to engage in certain activities is materially different from an exclusive right to provide services. While the statute certainly authorizes Polk City to provide water and wastewater services to the sprayfield, it falls short of granting an exclusive right to do so. Concomitantly, Auburndale’s annexation of its property cannot materially affect a nonexistent “exclusive” right. Legally and logically, Polk City cannot be considered an “affected party,” and it did not have standing to challenge the annexation.
Polk City, however, contends that City of Mt. Dora v. JJ’s Mobile Homes, Inc., 579 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), supports its position on standing. JJ’s Mobile Homes held that the Public Service Commission’s conferral of a franchise on a private utility to provide water and sewer service constituted a property right, and the municipality was not authorized to interfere with that property right by the “subsequent annexation of a portion of the private company’s territory.” Id. at 224.
However, JJ’s Mobile Homes differs from this case in two significant ways.
First, JJ’s Mobile Homes owned exclusive franchise rights, but Polk City does not possess an exclusive right to provide water and wastewater services to the annexed property.
Second, the City of Mt. Dora annexed property belonging to JJ’s Mobile Homes; here, Auburndale annexed its own property, not Polk City’s, into Auburn-dale’s corporate limits.
Furthermore, even if Polk City actually enjoyed an exclusive right to provide water and wastewater services to the annexed property, it still would not rise to the level of a “party affected” because the annexation has no impact on the property’s need for water and wastewater services, nor does it thwart Polk City’s delivery of such services. Although Auburndale intends to use the annexed property to dispose of wastewater, it remains that no water or wastewater' service needs arise out of the annexed property; rather, wastewater generated elsewhere is being sprayed onto the annexed property. The annexation-does not alter the present-or potential need for water and wastewater services on the property, nor does it prevent Polk City from extending such services if and when the need arises. Since Auburndale’s annexation of the subject property does not disrupt Polk City’s ability to provide water and wastewater services to that property, Polk City, as a matter of law, is not affected by the annexation.
Because the annexation does not “affect” Polk City as required by section 171.081, Polk City did not have standing to bring a petition for certiorari challenging Auburn-dale’s adoption of the annexation ordinance. Thus, by granting Polk City’s petition, the circuit court violated a clearly established principle of law, causing a miscarriage of justice. See Housing Auth. of Tampa v. Burton, 874 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Accordingly, we grant Auburndale’s petition for certiorari and quash the circuit court’s order. NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cnty. OF Volusia v. City OF Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…ation ordinance under section 171.081. The County timely petitioned for certiorari review of the circuit court’s decision. Circuit courts review annexation ordinances by certiorari under section 171.081. See City of Auburndale v. Town of Polk City, 898 So. 2d 1101, 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); City of Tallahassee v. Kovach, 733 So. 2d 576, 577-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In this first-tier review, the court determines only: whether the lower tribunal afforded the parties procedural due process; whether the essential…
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Matlacha Civic Assoc., Inc. v. City of Cape Coral, 273 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…tion 171.031(5). Based on this determination, it 1In arguing that the petitioners must demonstrate a present material injury, the City, and subsequently the trial court, relied on this court's decision in City of Auburndale v. Town of Polk City, 898 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). That case is inapposite because it does not involve the statutory definition of "parties affected." Polk City did not assert it was a party "affected" pursuant to section 171.031(5), Florida Statutes (2003), presumably becau…
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City OF OAK Hill v. City OF Edgewater & Cnty. of Volusia, 917 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…the circuit court’s opinion and held, as a matter of law, that Polk City was not affected by the annexation merely because it had established a Chapter 180 reserve area within the annexed property. See City of Auburndale v. Town of Polk [*945] City, 898 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In this certiorari proceeding, Oak Hill continues to challenge Edgewater’s standing and entitlement to reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under section 171.081. To prevail on appeal, Oak Hill must show that Edgewater is…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Martin Cnty. v. The City OF Stuart, 736 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- City OF Mount Dora v. JJ's Mobile Homes, Inc., 579 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Dobson v. State, 874 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Hous. Auth. OF the City OF Tampa v. Burton, 874 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)