ICIAR MISIAK, APPELLANT,
v.
GREGORY M. MISIAK, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a dissolution of marriage case, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of alimony to the former wife in a long-term marriage, holding that nominal permanent alimony should be awarded despite the former husband's current inability to pay, based on the length of marriage, the parties' high standard of living, and his earning potential.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying nominal permanent alimony to the former wife. Despite the former husband's current inability to pay, nominal permanent alimony should be awarded based on the length of the marriage, the parties' high standard of living, and the former husband's earning potential.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a request for nominal, permanent alimony in a long-term marriage where alimony would otherwise be indicated, even if the pa…
[2] In dissolution of marriage proceedings, nominal alimony may be awarded to preserve a party's right to seek future modification of alimony.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“although alimony would ordinarily be indicated due to the length of marriage, lifestyle, and Appellee's earning potential, because Appellee did not have the present ability to pay, and Appellant's needs were currently met through her share of the equitable distribution, Appellant's request for alimony should be denied”
Statement of the trial court's reasoning for denying alimony, which the appellate court found to be an abuse of discretion
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties had a long-term marriage during which the former wife remained at home raising their minor child while the former husband earned substanti…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Ability To Pay Alimony cases and more on FLexlaw
TORPY, J.
In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Appellant, the former wife, raises several issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion and reversal — whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award the former wife nominal, permanent alimony.
This was a long-term marriage during which the former wife stayed at home' and reared the parties’ minor child. The former husband earned substantial income throughout the marriage from his employment with high technology and defense contractors. The last position held by the former husband was as president of Litton Systems, Inc., earning an annual salary of $193,000, plus significant bonuses. The parties enjoyed a high standard of living, residing in a 5,000 square foot home in an affluent subdivision with a country club membership.
In November of 1998, Appellee decided to leave his employment for medical reasons after having heart bypass surgery. Appellant consented to this decision. At that time, the parties intended to start a business, but that never materialized. Later, the parties separated. The parties’ son, now 17, primarily resides with Appellant and will attend high school beyond his eighteenth birthday. Since Appellee quit his employment with Litton, the parties have been depleting assets to pay living expenses. Although Appellee, now age 58, is capable of working, he has not been able to secure employment.
The trial judge determined that, although alimony would ordinarily be indicated due to the length of marriage, lifestyle, and Appellee’s earning potential, because Appellee did not have the present ability to pay, and Appellant’s needs were currently met through her share of the equitable distribution, Appellant’s request for alimony should be denied.
Appellant argues that the failure to award at least nominal alimony was an abuse of discretion. We agree. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 793 So. 2d 989, 992 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Therefore, we reverse that portion of the final judgment and remand this cause with instructions that the former wife be awarded nominal, permanent alimony. In all other respects, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER and MONACO, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Terje Gulbrandsen v. Gulbrandsen, 22 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…mony finds ample support in the case law. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 997 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 793 So. 2d 989, 992 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Squindo v. Osuna—Squindo, 943 So. 2d 232, 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Misiak v. Misiak, 898 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). . In Barbieri v. Barbieri, 582 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), cited by the trial court in the amended final judgment, a minor child was residing in the home at the time of the lump sum award. The former husband in that ca…1 / 2
-
Tuthill v. Tuthill, 954 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 450 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (reversing permanent periodic alimony to wife whose income virtually equaled that of husband and whose earning capacity and net worth exceeded those of husband); see also Misiak v. Misiak, 898 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (affirming denial of substantial alimony by trial judge where former husband did not have current ability to pay and former wife’s needs were currently met through her share of the equitable distribution). Affirmed in part, R…
-
Quinones v. Quinones, 182 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…tions. We find, given the parties’ changing circumstances and the trial court’s incorrect characterization of the length of the marriage, that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award at least nominal alimony. See Misiak v. Misialc, 898 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (finding an abuse of discretion on similar facts); see also Marshall v. Marshall, 953 So. 2d 23, 25-26 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (upholding an award of nominal-. permanent alimony because it “leaves open the possibility of increa…
Authorities Cited
- Blanchard v. Maran L. Blanchard, 793 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)