EDUARDO CHAVEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Eduardo Chavez appealed the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief challenging his 1997 guilty plea to cocaine possession, claiming the interpreter failed to translate the trial court's warning about adverse immigration consequences. The appellate court affirmed the denial, finding the motion untimely and the record clear that Chavez was properly advised and understood the immigration consequences.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion on two grounds: (1) the motion was untimely as it was filed in 2004, well past the two-year limit under Rule 3.850(b), and (2) even if timely, the motion lacked merit because the plea transcript shows the trial court properly advised Chavez of immigration consequences and he responded that he understood, with the transcript contradicting his claims about the interpreter's conduct.
[1] A motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 is untimely if filed more than two years after the conviction.
[2] A trial court is required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8) to inform a defendant that a guilty plea may have adverse immigration consequences.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The transcript of the plea colloquy indicates that the trial court asked the defendant, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8), whether he understood that, if he was not a citizen of the United States, the plea could have adverse immigration consequences, and that the defendant responded that he understood.”
Establishes that the trial court made the required immigration warning and Chavez responded affirmatively that he understood
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChavez pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine on August 18, 1997. The trial court asked him whether he understood that his plea could have adverse im…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Florida Rule Of Criminal Procedure 3.172(C)(8) cases and more on FLexlaw
ROTHENBERG, Judge.
The defendant, Eduardo Chavez, appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm.
On August 18, 1997, the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine. The transcript of the plea colloquy indicates that the trial court asked the defendant, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8), whether he understood that, if he was not a citizen of the United States, the plea could have adverse immigration consequences, and that the defendant responded that he understood.
The defendant filed a 3.850 motion seeking to vacate his sentence, arguing that the plea was not made voluntarily with the understanding that his plea could have adverse immigration consequences. The defendant acknowledges that the transcript indicates that the trial court informed him that the plea could have adverse immigration consequences, but asserts that “the interpreter never translated anything that was said during the plea colloquy; rather, the interpreter asked the defendant in Spanish whether he wanted to go to jail and, when defendant replied in the negative, told defendant in Spanish that if he simply answered as instructed by the translator, defendant would only have to sign a piece of paper and the matter would be concluded.” The defendant also filed a supplement to the post-conviction motion contending that the motion was timely filed because it was filed less than two years after learning that he was under the threat of deportation. He argued that on October 30, 2002, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) notified him that his application for Lawful Permanent Resident had been denied based on his 1997 conviction for possession of cocaine.1
The trial court summarily denied the defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief finding that it was untimely, and that even if it was timely filed, it was premature because he was not under the threat of deportation. The defendant’s appeal follows. The defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his 3.850 motion. We disagree.
First, the defendant entered into the plea in 1997 and filed the 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief in 2004. Therefore, the motion was untimely because it was filed well past the two-year time limit prescribed by Rule 3.850(b). Second, even if timely filed, the trial court properly denied the motion because the plea transcript indicates that the defendant was properly advised by the trial court that his plea could have negative consequences upon his immigration status, and that the defendant responded that he understood. Moreover, the transcript unequivocally disputes the defendant’s claim that the interpreter was not interpreting. The transcript indicates that the defendant answered responsively to each question asked of him by the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief.
. Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, at the time that the motion was filed, he was not under the threat of deportation. See Kindelan v. State, 786 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(holding that petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief just because INS had advised him that he was excludable from the United States as a result of his conviction).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Ehoud Buton v. State, 995 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…contemplated by Peart at that time. Kindelan v. State, 786 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (finding that denial of a request for permanent resident status, and a finding that the movant was removable, was not a threat of deportation); Chavez v. State, 899 So. 2d 430, 431 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (finding that denial of application for permanent resident status was not a “threat of deportation” under Peart). Thus, although aware he was subject to deportation, Buton’s claim did not ripen under Peart and was not ex…
-
Sanchez v. State, 913 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Chavez v. State, 899 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).…
Authorities Cited
- Kindelan v. State, 786 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)