ROSHUAN BALLARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2005-04-15
No. 1D03-4922
ALLEN, KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
899 So. 2d 1186 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Roshuan Ballard was convicted of aggravated child abuse for allegedly choking his seven-year-old daughter. The trial court admitted evidence of alleged abuse in California over his objection, which the appellate court found was presented so prominently that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, depriving him of a fair trial.


Holding

The appellate court held that the trial court erred in permitting the collateral crime evidence to become a feature of the trial, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, thereby denying the appellant a fair trial. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence of prior bad acts or crimes is admissible to prove a material fact at issue if it is not solely admitted to prove bad character or propensity, and its prejudicia…

[2] Admission of collateral crime evidence is unduly prejudicial and denies a fair trial when such evidence becomes a feature of the trial.

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Key Quotes

“evidence of prior bad acts or crimes is relevant to prove a material fact at issue if the evidence is not being admitted solely to prove bad character or propensity”

Establishes the general admissibility standard for collateral crime evidence under Florida law

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was charged with aggravated child abuse by malicious punishment for allegedly choking his seven-year-old daughter. At trial, the state prese…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of his conviction and sentence for aggravated child abuse, arguing that the admission of collateral crime evidence deprived him of a fair trial. Because this evidence became a feature of the trial, we conclude that it was unduly prejudicial and, hence, denied appellant a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse.

Appellant was charged with one count of aggravated child abuse by malicious punishment for allegedly choking his seven-year-old daughter.

At trial, over appellant’s objection, the trial court admitted evidence of alleged abuse which occurred in California. Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or crimes is relevant to prove a material fact at issue if the evidence is not being admitted solely to prove bad character or propensity. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).

However, for such evidence to be admissible, its prejudicial effect must not outweigh its probative value. § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2003); Turtle v. State, 600 So. 2d 1214, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Here, the trial court permitted the state to make the collateral crime evidence a feature of the trial by presenting testimony regarding the evidence from four of its six witnesses; by publishing photographs of injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the alleged prior abuse; and by emphasizing the evidence in both its opening statement and its closing arguments. This was error because, by becoming a feature of the trial, the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. We have considered, but reject, the state’s argument that any error was harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla.1986) (for error to be harmless, the state must satisfy the reviewing court to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict); Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1999) (reaffirming that the DiGuilio test applies in criminal appeals to both constitutional and nonconsti-tutional error).

Accordingly, we must reverse appellant’s conviction and sentence, and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

ALLEN, KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Seavey v. State, 8 So. 3d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …eral crimes evidence, leads to the conclusion that the evidence impermissibly became a feature of the trial. Cf. Jones v. State, 944 So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Morrow v. State, 931 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Ballard v. State, 899 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. VILLANTI and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.…
  • Hetherington v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)
    …to the jury. Finally, the prior bad act of Appellant putting a handgun to the victim’s head was not a feature of the trial. This goes to the issue of whether an improper basis was used for the jury to decide Appellant’ guilt. See Ballard v. State, 899 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (reversing where collateral crimes evidence was made a feature of the trial “by presenting testimony regarding the evidence from four of its six witnesses; by publishing photographs of injuries allegedly sustained as a resu…
  • Ballard v. McNeil, 785 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (N.D. Fla. 2011)
    …. at 69-77). Petitioner, through counsel, appealed the judgment to the Florida First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”). The First DCA reversed the conviction and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial (Ex. B). Ballard v. State, 899 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Petitioner was retried on July 19, 2005, and again convicted as charged (Ex. A at 118, Ex. C). The trial court again imposed a sentence of twenty (20) years of imprisonment (Ex. C at 239, Ex. K at 33-40). Petitioner appealed…
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