FERROT ULYSSE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ferrot Ulysse appealed the denial of his motion to suppress narcotics and a firearm seized from his home after police officers pursued a fleeing passenger from a stolen vehicle into his residence. The court affirmed, holding that the warrantless entry was justified under the hot pursuit exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
The warrantless entry was legal under the hot pursuit exception. The officers had probable cause to believe the fleeing passenger had committed either vehicle theft or trespass in a conveyance, and hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect is permissible where the offense is punishable by incarceration. The motion to suppress was correctly denied.
[1] Officers have probable cause to believe a passenger in a stolen vehicle who flees on foot has committed a crime, such as theft or trespass in a conveyance.
[2] Flight from the scene of a crime may be considered in combination with other circumstances as evidence of guilt.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Flight from the scene may be considered in combination with other circumstances as evidence of guilt.”
Establishes that the passenger's flight provided evidence supporting probable cause for the officers' pursuit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaw enforcement officers pursued a stolen vehicle. When stopped, the driver was apprehended and the passenger fled on foot. Two officers chased the fl…
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COPE, J.
Ferrot Ulysse contends that law enforcement officers made an illegal war-rantless entry of his home, and that the evidence they seized should have been suppressed. We conclude that the officers were in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect and that the entry was legal.
Law enforcement officers pursued a stolen vehicle. The vehicle stopped. The driver and passenger fled on foot and the driver was apprehended without incident.
The passenger who fled on foot was chased by police officers. The passenger ran inside the home of defendant-appellant Ulysse, a complete stranger. Two officers pursued the fleeing passenger into the house. There the officers saw narcotics and a firearm in plain view, which they seized. The narcotics and firearm belonged to the defendant.
The State charged the defendant with possession of cocaine with intent to sell, resisting an officer without violence, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the narcotics and firearm seized by the officers. The defendant entered a plea of nolo contende-re, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
The defendant argues that the officers had no probable cause to believe that the passenger in the stolen automobile had committed a crime, and that hot pursuit of the passenger into the defendant’s home was unjustified. The trial court correctly rejected that argument.
In this case the officers observed that the defendant was in the passenger seat of a stolen car. Upon the car being stopped, the defendant fled. Flight from the scene may be considered in combination with other circumstances as evidence of guilt. See Fenelon v. State, 594 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla.1992); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). On the facts here, a reasonable officer would have probable cause to believe that the passenger had participated in the theft of the car, see § 812.014(2)(c)6, Fla. Stat. (2001),* or at the least, trespass in a conveyance. See id. § 810.08; see also State v. Black, 617 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (defining elements of probable cause). Under either analysis, the officers were justifiably in hot pursuit of the passenger who ran into the defendant’s house.
The defendant suggests that the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply if the officers are pursuing a fleeing misdemeanant. That point has been resolved in this district adversely to the defendant’s position. See Gasset v. State, 490 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant is permissible where the misdemeanor is punishable by a jail sentence. Id. at 98. The offense of trespass in a conveyance is a misdemeanor punishable by incarceration of sixty days or one year, depending on the circumstances. See § 810.08(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). The defendant argues that Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), holds otherwise, but that case involved a nonjailable offense and in that case there was no immediate or continuous pursuit. Id. at 751-54; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (distinguishing Welsh as having involved a nonjailable offense).
In this case, whether the passenger is properly viewed as a fleeing felon or fleeing misdemeanant, hot pursuit was permissible. The motion to suppress evidence was correctly denied.
Affirmed.
*
The crime date was July 17, 2001.
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State v. Markus, 211 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2017)…t was a “hot” pursuit (i.e., the pursuit was continuous and immediate). The court relied on the district court cases State v. Brown, 36 So. 3d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2010); Ulysse, 899 So. 2d 1233; and Gasset v. State, 490 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), to conclude that hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant is permissible when the crime is punishable by a jail sentence. A multi-day trial followed. During trial, the jury was instructed that th…1 / 2
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State v. Brown, 36 So. 3d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…ng from an officer were “only” misdemeanors. See § 775.082(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 790.25(3), Florida Statutes (2007); § 790.053(3), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also § 775.082(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (2007). In Ulysse v. State, 899 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), however, this Court squarely held that the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement is nonetheless fully applicable. The defendant suggests that the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Am…
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Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (U.S. 2021)…t has no privacy interest to protect. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 141 (1978); see also State v. Walker, 2006–1045, p. 7 (La. 4/11/07), 953 So. 2d 786, 790–791 (suspect fed into third person's residence where he was unwelcome); Ulysse v. State, 899 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. App. 2005) (suspect ran inside the home of “a complete stranger”). The police may well have no reason to know whether the suspect entered his own or someone else's home or yard. If the suspect does 328 LANGE v. CALIFORNIA Roberts, C. J…
Authorities Cited
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000)
- Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (U.S. 1984)
- King Anthony Green v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992)
- Illinois v. McARTHUR, 531 U.S. 326 (U.S. 2001)
- Alfonso v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Coldwell Banker, 490 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Gasset v. State, 490 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- State v. Black, 617 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)